5Abi

In the South of this sector the Indians brigade in Punch had remained on the defensive. The revolutionaries had disrupted the L of C to Punch very badly and Punch had, at one time, become very nearly a besieged garrison. Lately the revolutionaries had diverted their main attention to Rajauri and as a result the Indian garrison in Punch had got a little breathing space. The capture of Mandi by the revolutionaries so close to Punch had caused the Indians a great deal of concern but it had also helped Punch garrison indirectly by releasing pressure against it. By 30 August the Indians were in a position to venture out of Punch and start the offensive northwards. They first started shelling Chand Tekri on 30 August. They had:


25 Pounders 18
Medium Gun 6
3.7 Howitzers 6
4.2 Mortars 6

Our forces had:


25 Pounders 1
3.7 Howitzers 2

The shelling of Chand tekri and other positions opposite Punch continued on 31 August and 1 September. On addition over 100 rounds of RR s were used by the Indians to break the bunkers on Chand Tekri on 1 September alone. The Indians put in an attack on 2 September at 0200 hours but it was successfully repulsed.

On 5 September the shelling of Chand Tekri was intensified by the enemy and attack appeared imminent. The misfortune was that there was no reserve available to reinforce this sub-sector. As this stage the two 3.7 Howitzers were also lost this area and the only artillery support available to Chand tekri was one 25 pounder gun. On 6 September the Indians launched a full brigade attack on Chand Tekri at 0430 hours. The battalions used were 2 Sikh, 3 Dogra, and 3 Rrajputana Rifles. Opposite this large force supported by 36 pieces of artillery, the position was held by:

· One Platoon of Azad Kashmir · Two Platoons Civil Armed Forces · One Platoon Local Mujahids · One Platoon Rangers



They were supported by only one 25 pounder gun. Outnumbered by 1:25 in manpower, 1:36 in artillery and with no MMGs, mortars or RRs these one hundred odd determined men withstood the onslaught as few defenders have done in the history of war. The Indians had used the hours of darkness for the initial approach. All three batalions had followed different routes. It was thus a three pronged attack converging on Chand Tekri. The last few yards were very costly to the Indians but they had captured their objectives. Our casualties in dead and wounded had been over 50%, to be exact 33 dead and 29 wounded had been. The C.A.F platoon had only 5 survivors. One can confidently say that they had fought well.

The Indian emboldened by their first success from the South advanced and attacked Ziarat on 9 September. This attack was successfully repulsed but during the next night the Indians using the cover of darkness out flanked the position and over ran it by first light. With the loss of Ziarat the road to Haji Pir Pass from the South was open to the Indians but not for use. The westward area dominating the road was still in our hands and the Indians could neither use nor repair it while these positions were held by us. The road was not used by the Indians as a result until the cease fire on 23 September.

The Indians kept on attacking the positions to the West of road Punch-Uri but all their attacks were repulsed. The last attack came on 20 September when 7/11 Sikh tried to gain ground across the road but after suffering a a large number of casualties they fell back. The two main positions which enabled the Indians to dominate Bedori bulge were Haji Pir Pass and Chand Tekri. As it happened both these were lost due to shortage of infantry and absence of artillery in that sector. Two weak battalions were holding a front of nearly 65 miles at a time when they had no supporting arms.