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On the same day Pakistani forces under Major General Yahya Khan headed forward towards Akhnoor, having mopped up all opposition in and around Jurian and in the villages of Thindi Wali Khad and Mawa Wali Khad. 13 Punjab had now moved forward as the vanguard. Due to hilly terrain, the movement was slow. The enemy was putting up s half hearted opposition inspite of the fact that the terrain was more suited for defense. 13 Punjab completely surprised the enemy through difficult terrain and captured Chak Karpal and Dalpat villages.

On 6 September, while India was advancing across the International border, 7 Infantry Division was poised to continue its move forward to Akhnoor and finalized the operations in this sector. 102 and 10 Infantry Brigades consolidated their positions along the line of Jamotian and Maira villages. The division, on this day, lost most its artillery support and 11 Cavalry.

On the other hand the enemy has received reinforcements and had launched a massive counter-attack with strong armour and artillery support against 10 Infantry Brigade positions. The division had just received congratulatory messages from the President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the C-in-C, Pakistan Army General Mohammad Musa, and the men were in the right mood to give a good reception to the Indian counter attack. The result was nothing less than whole sale slaughter. The counter attack came to a standstill by the early afternoon and the Indian withdrew to their original positions leaving behind over 500 dead bodies. The enemy had to bring in air support to extricate their forward elements. Pakistani casualties due to their counter attack were one officer Major Sarwar and six other ranks killed.

On 7 September the enemy put in fresh counter attack supported by armour against 13 Punjab and against positions held by 102 Infantry Brigade. Both counter attacks were beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy. 10 Infantry Brigade was ordered to be ready to move out of the area leaving behind only 102 Brigade and 4 AK Brigade. Although the idea to advance as far as Akhnoor had been dropped, the move forward and offensive attitude had not been given up by the GOC. The result was that when the enemy counter attacks failed, the Indians withdrew in a hurry.

During the night 7/8 September, the enemy again tried infiltration tactics but failed and had to withdraw leaving behind a number of dead and 1 officer, Capt. Chingara, 1 JCO and 20 other ranks prisoners of war, all that remained of a whole company of 120 strong. A heavy price to pay for the whims of some misguided senior officer.

This move forward after beating the India counter attack enabled our own guns to move forward and shell Akhnoor which created a great deal of panic among Indian L of C troops who were reported to have deserted from Akhnoor in large numbers.

The enemy tried hard to infiltrate through the gap between the two brigades but was unsuccessful and in fact suffered heavy casualties in the process.

The next morning, 8 September, 6 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brig. Iftikhar Khan Janjua H. J. was brought in and 10 Infantry Brigade moved out of the area. Enemy again tried to benefit from the gap between the two brigades and attacked from the area Pulhwal which lay between the two brigades. It was a sound idea executed in a haphazard manner and the result was that as on previous occasions it served as a killing ground. The Indians were hemmed in and wholesale massacre took place forcing them to give up the attack when it had hardly gone half way.

On 9 September the GOC decided that enough use had been made of this gap and ordered that it should be closed. 8 Baluch was ordered by brig. Zafar Ali Khan, Commander 102 Infantry Brigade to capture Pulhwal.

The Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Muhammad Siddiqui Kha, went into attack with great dash and moving forward with determination threw the enemy out of Pulhwal inflicting a number of casualties on the retreating Indians. The GOC 10 Infantry Division was furious at the way fighting had been progressing and ordered 191 Independent Indian Infantry brigade to put in a full scale brigade attack and recapture Pulhwal.

The Indian attack on a two battalion front came in a little before first light and was directed against positions held by 8 Baluch and 15 Punjab. Pakistan artillery alone was able to break up this attack. The Indians never reached near enough for Pakistani infantrymen to come to grips with the Indians. A few of the Indians who had not retreated and who preferred the safety of POW camps stood up after day break, raising their hands and waiving white handkerchiefs and were taken prisoners.

Akhnoor brigade was shelled by Pakistan artillery during the day causing great confusion in the L of C troops and the Indian garrison as a result had to more back a considerable distance to be out of artillery range. The enemy's habit of piecemeal attack was repeated on 11 September as well. A number of probing attacks were made by the Indians along the front but in each place they were beaten back with considerable casualties.

On 12 September, 6 Punjab with a company of 15 Punjab attacked and captured Devi Pur, thus extending their F.D.Ls. This brought in a a quick counter attack by the enemy after dark. They tried their best to recapture the lost territory but were beaten back with heavy casualties.

To the left of this position a company of 9 Punjab attacked Manami and captured not only the village but a dominating feature in the vicinity. 14 AK kept up pressure against the enemy in the area of village Ghauri while these attacks were being launched.

We lost 2 officers, 2 JCO and 10 other ranks on this day and 1 JCO and 36 other ranks were wounded but the operation had not only extended our F.D.Ls. but had taken a heavy toll of the enemy.

Night attacks are a normal feature of war and no critic can accuse the Indian Commanders of cowardice, for having a bias in favor of night attacks. The analysis made by Indian Command after the war appears to have further strengthened the Indian preferences for night attacks. Their Arguments are sound up to a point. Infiltration is easier at night and casualties are comparatively less due to the defenders' inability to bring down aimed fire, but when the defending troops do not fall back inspite of infiltration, and have adequate resources to deal with the infiltrators the resulting casualties are far more than in the case of day light attacks.

Enemy build up continued on 13 and 14 September. The only activity on the front by the enemy, however, was heavy shelling of our positions. On 15 September the enemy tried to capture a feature from 15 Punjab but were thrown back. Our fighting patrols destroyed a few of the enemy bunkers and brought back useful information. No large scale operation was undertaken by either side. On 16 and 17 September also the enemy confined his activities to heavy shelling. Due to heavy build up in the North of our position a certain amount of reallocation of troops and areas were undertaken by the GOC, within the divisional area.

On 18 September minor clashes occurred in which each side succeeded in getting a feature from the other. This was the first and only time an enemy battalion attack had managed to snatch a feature from one of our companies in this sector. On 19 September the Indians launched a major dawn attack on 9 Punjab front. The attack was repulsed with considerable number of casualties to the enemy. Enemy Hunters tried to strafe our forward position but seemed to be in a hurry to depart and did not cause any damage.

Until the cease fire there was no further major activity on the part of the Indians. They, however, became very active immediately after the cease fire and kept on putting in attack after attack and losing men without any sense or purpose until 3rd of December, 1965. Such reckless use of Indian manpower and material was not unique to this front. In was universal. On every front where the Indians had lost territory to Pakistan, and either the forward formations had not reported to the Army headquarters or the government of India had kept it secret from the press and the public, they were keen, in fact desperate to recapture the lost territories. Now that both the press and public were likely to know the exact state of affairs, the Indian Commanders were prepared to lose valuable Indian lives merely to save face. Queer philosophy but there it is.