5Abi

The Pakistani commander opposing him was not so fortunate. Major General Mohammad Sarfraz Khan had in all seven infantry battalions and a front of 89,000 yards to defend.

He could not do the simple arithmetic exercise and sit back. He considered the likely axis and having allotted sectors to brigades kept a little reserve in hand. 103 Infantry Brigade was given the right sector, from including Hudiara Drain to exclusive of Railway line Lahore - Wagah. The left sector stretching upto Ravi was given to 114 Infantry Brigade. 22 Infantry Brigade with only four companies of Infantry and 23 Cavalry less one Squadron was kept as the striking force. The positions had been occupied after midnight on the night 5/6 September. Although it had earlier been planned to lay a mine field in front of BRB canal, there was no time to do so.

GOC 10 Infantry Division had placed a small screen of a platoon, on the main Wagah axis from R&S battalion under Major Arif Jan. This small force cost the Indians heavily. Major Arif allowed the Indian to come close and then opened fire at short range. In view of the inadequate light this was the only course open to him. This platoon not only held up the Indian advance along the main Wagah road but inflicted very heavy casualties on them. The Indians, however, on their flanks had managed to by pass them. Rather than surrender they put up a gallant fight. Major Arif and his small band of men will for ever be remembered as a force which fought to the last man and last round. No one left his post. Not one of them was taken prisoner. They all achieved the highest distinction that man can get.

The battalion astride the Lahore-Wagah road was 3rd Battalion of the Baluch regiment. A little after first light they saw the Indians advancing astride the road. In front of the advancing Indians were a large number of refugees, men, women and children, hurrying across as if driven by a pack of blood thirsty fiends. The Baluchis could not engage the enemy until the refugees had crossed the bridge. It was risky but they could not shoot their own people. The stout resistance put up by the small R&S section under Major Arif had upset the entire schedule of 54 Indian Infantry Brigade allotted to this sector.

The Indian commander had three approaches to this position and he had allotted a battalion to each one of these. 13 battalion of Indian Punjab Regiment, on the left of Indian flank was, as a result the first to gain contact with Pakistani defenders. This happened at 0600 hours opposite Jallo railway station. Heavy toll of the Indians were taken by the company in this position supported by its own artillery. In fact the artillery fire was so accurate that the enemy fell back never to venture forward again.

The next to approach the defensive position in this sector was 15 battalion of the Dogra Regiment, following the main Wagah axis. They reached the killing ground supported by tanks at 0645 hours and having lost two of its tanks in the first few minutes called it a day. The company of 3 Baluch in this part of the sector had the moral support of many senior officers being with them. The battalion commander Lt. Col. Tajammul Hussain Malik and the brigade commander , Brig. Aftab Ahmed Khan who with the Engineer officer Lt. Col. Suleman Khan and the gunner Lt. Col. Imdad Ali Khan were all present in their midst. They were watching the Indian advance from the road bridge at Batapur. It may not have been strictly according to the customs of service, but the presence of these senior officers on the main axis made a great deal of difference. They were in a position to see the situation all the time rather than get it at intervals.

The enemy got exasperated and instead of using his third battalion, 3 Jat as planned, Switched it also on the main road. This attack came in at 0800 hours and was again stopped but it was felt that the thin screen of the Dograi had successfully accomplished its task. This company of 3 Baluch was, therefore, pulled back at about 0900 hours. At about the same time Pakistan Air Force (PAF) joined in the shoot and came out of it with a heavy bag of tanks, trucks and large clusters of men. The place was in shambles. The front companies were running back, the rear companies were being pushed and goaded forward. The supply service and the engineers who had been kept unduly too far forward by the Indians with the hope of their being used for providing additional crossings over the river Ravi, provided excellent game to the gallant pilots of PAF. The Indians had permitted thousands of Jan Singhis to get into lorries and trucks commandeered in Amritsar, ant to follow the Army into Lahore, for shopping at will. Foreigners reaching Pakistan after the war have given a description of the traffic jams created as a result of these civilians trying to run back to safety, in their transport, when they saw the army in front being plastered by PAF.

The enemy realized the importance of Batapur bridge and inspite of the heavy losses that his forward troops had sustained he was putting in attack after attack on it. The artillery on both sides was pounding the area all around it. The bridge was still intact and was not blown until midnight 6/7 September. Enemy tanks were hardly six hundred yards away. A few vehicles from the Indian side strayed across and were all immobilized on the road. They proved very useful later on. They provided cover to the defenders in moving about in the vicinity of the bridge. The artillery and small arms dual continued throughout the major part of the day. The enemy had committed all the three battalions of the leading brigade. The night was spent by our troops in digging in and replenishing and by the enemy in reconnoitering for a likely crossing over BRB canal.

The new formation brought forward by the Indians was 50 Indian Para Brigade. It arrived on the evening of 7 September and went into attack against B company of 3 Baluch same night. This company had tenaciously kept the far bank of BRB under control and although it had hardly about 50 men on the other side, yet these devoted men kept the Para Brigade away from them. The Indian Infantry never came to grips with our men. They were the attackers. It was up to them to get into a dog fight and force the issue. The previous day's experience of coming forward boldly and dampened their spirits. They invariably shelled the positions for two hours before every attack. The moment the barrage lifted the Indian army would get up, shout, "jai Hind" and "Charge" from a distance of 300 to 400 yards and immediately the Pakistan artillery opened up or the small arm fire was brought on them, they would hug the ground. The performance would be repeated and the wireless message could be intercepted saying "heavy casualties - falling back". At the other end some commander could be heard shouting, "You ---------- go forward". The Indians on this front, however, did not relish going forward, little knowing that the move backwards would be equally costly. The Indians changed over to night attacks, on the next night, but even the cover of darkness did not provide enough security. Early in the morning on 8 September the enemy was seen with drawing and were hastened backwards by a few bursts of MMG and LMGs. One could not afford to waste ammunition on harmless enemy homeward bound.

The Indian commander, on this front, now calculated the economics of killing Pakistani soldiers in terms of rupees, and felt that considering the family pension and children's allowances to be paid to the families of the dead it was cheaper to confine to artillery shelling. It was also safer method of passing the day. It kept both sides busy and helped in filling up the pages of situation reports giving laudatory details og imaginary counter attacks by Pakistani beaten back by the brave Sena. These, however, to their discomfort were not all to be imaginary. The GOC was instructed by the C-in-C to probe forward with the small striking force at his disposal. This he did on * September. It meant crossing the BRB canal.