The Indian Elephant comes to a Grinding halt at Chawinda
Sialkot sector had always been upper most in the minds of Pakistan. Across it, lays the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which in addition to the outright injustice of the case and India usurping it forcefully, it posed a direct threat to the innermost areas of Pakistan. Any threat based on Kashmir would come at right angles to the threat from India itself there by weakening defenses facing India and could not be anything but a source of great anxiety to Pakistan. As far as India was concerned, Kashmir was ideally suited as a jumping ground to attack Pakistan. The military build up during the last few years under the assumed threat from China had given India a good excuse, if she needed one, to build up the strength in Kashmir to unusually large six divisions. Indian infantry brigades in Kashmir have the habit of having up to seven infantry battalions as a measure of solace and over insurance.
Pakistan could not afford to keep more than one medium size infantry division in this sector. 15 Infantry Division containing 7 Infantry Battalion only was placed in Sialkot. Its armour compliment consisted of 25 cavalry and two tank delivery units. The division was commanded by Brig. Sardar Mohammad Ismail Khan.
The Indian garrison opposite to this small force was 26 Indian Division with four oversize brigades and two armoured regiments. It had been anticipated that the enemy could launch a three pronged attack from the following directions; Dera Baba Nanak, Samba and Jammu. The areas of responsibility of the brigades of 15 Infantry Division were as a result as follows:
101 Infantry Brigade (2 battalions) astride Sialkot Jammu Road under the command of Brig. S. M. Hussain
104 Infantry Brigade (One infantry battalion only) Area Uggoki as Divisional Strike Force
24 Infantry Brigade (Two infantry battalions plus one Armoured Regiment) Area Chawinda under the command of Brig. Malik Abdul Ali Khan
115 Infantry Brigade (Two infantry battalions) Area: Jassar under the command of Brig. Muzzafaruddin
6 Armoured Division commanded by Maj. General Abrar Hussain, which in fact was no more than an Armoured Brigade, was placed in Daska area to be used as required. It had under it, two Armoured Regiments and one Infantry Battalion. The Guides Cavalry, 22 Cavalry and 14 FF with proportionate supporting arms and services.
The Indian build up in early September opposite 15 Division was substantial. The Indians had brought in three infantry divisions including one oversize mountain division and their crack 1 Indian Armoured Division. The details of these were to be known as fighting developed. The Indian plan in this sector unfolded itself gradually and was most unrealistic. It had neither taken the capabilities of the Indian soldiers into account not had been fair in assessing the fighting qualities of Pakistan Army. It smelt of Hyderabad Police Station. General Chaudhuri had decided to attack with one strong division at Suchetgarh and a brigade at Jassar. He knew the strength of both 15 Infantry Division and 6 Armoured Division and expected the armoured division with its armoured regiments to be equally divided between the two garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot. The attack having been launched on 6 September would in the opinion of Indian C-in-C, draw the whole Pakistan Army in this sector of these two corner points. When Pakistan garrison was fully sucked into these two extreme corners and was committed completely the main attack from Samba would roll down the plains lead by Indian Armoured Division. According to General Chaudhuri there would be nothing to stop this mighty force, not even a section of infantry. The garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot would be too committed to extricate themselves and even if they tried to fall back to interfere in the main attack they would be only following the Indian divisions and would never be permitted to re-establish any worthwhile defensive line. General Chaudhuri's optimism was really infectious. It permeated down to the brigade commanders' level but no further. The lower levels have to be more realistic. They are too far near the ground and they are the ones who have to capture ground and hold it or give it away. To them higher planning and lines across the map mean little. When it came to that level the situation looked different but more of that later.
As planned by India, the first place that took the brunt of Indian attack in this sector was Jassar. 3 Punjab was holding the brigade and a part of it was across it, in the little Pakistani enclave across the river Ravi. The Indians started shelling at 0315 hours, a quarter of an hour earlier than they crossed the border in other places. An hour later the attack came in, led by one infantry battalion and the Indians succeeded in securing foothold in the enclave. 3 Punjab put in a counter attack at 1000 hours on 6 September and had thrown back the Indians by 1200 hours. Simultaneously 4 FF cleared the Indian enclave on West bank of the river. There does not appear to have been much resistance to this action. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of Indians to defend their position on the right bank of Ravi was a clear indication that the Indian attack against Jassar was merely a feint. If they had meant to invade Pakistan from this direction in earnest, it would have been easier for them to build up across the river, by making use of the enclave as initial brigade head.
The artillery compliments of 15 Infantry Division, which had earlier helped 10 Infantry Brigade, in Chhamb and Jurian also returned during night 6/7 September and the position, became more reassuring.
The Indians were to continue giving the impression that the attack on Jassar was in real earnest. Between 0300 and 0630 hours on 7 September, but put in three attacks supported by massive artillery support and tanks. They succeeded in capturing the far end of the bridge eventually. The bridge as a result was blown up at 0800 hours the same day. The troops on the far end were ordered to swim to home side as it was not considered advisable to leave a few unsupported companies across the river. The Indians throughout the day, continued to try to enlarge their gains along the bridge but all their attempts were foiled.
26 Indian Division advancing along the main Sialkot-Jammu road did not make any headway on 6 and 7 September.
14 Indian Infantry Division rolled down across the wide stretch Charwah-Bajra Garhi on the night of 7/8 September. The attack started at 2330 hours. 3 FF fought delaying action and gradually fell back to the main defensive line around Phillorah. 3 FF was holding area Gadgor and adjoining villages. Although vastly outnumbered the battalion stood the most intense shelling and kept to its positions. A few platoon localities exchanged hands once but were immediately recaptured. The fight for every inch of the territory had started. It was like a cyclone. Waves clashing with waves and creating an uproar in the dark but few Pakistani soldiers stood steadfast. Attack after attack was coming and yet the thin line stood firm like a wall of steel.
The unit was ordered to fall back to Chawinda early in the morning on 8 September. By then, they were in danger of being cut off. They did so at first light. By the morning of 8 September the enemy with elements of 1 Indian Armoured Division had captured Maharajke, Charwa, Chobara, Gadgor and Phillorah villages.