5Abi

At 1430 hours, the Indians launched the third of their abortive attacks that day. By the evening the enemy had lost about 30 tanks and had started withdrawing. It appears that this was either meant to be a ruse or a withdrawal without sanction from higher headquarters as immedeately after last light the Indians started coming forward again. This again was infantry-tank combined attack. Pakistani troops fought back heroically and the enemy attack was repulsed once again. The GOC had, during the day, asked the Corps Commander to be given 4 Armoured Brigade but the latter was confident that the existing troops wold be able to stop all enemy efforts to break through. He intended using the 1 Armoured Division for the offensive operations the moment it was clear that the Indians had committed all their reserve formations in this sector. After this battle, the GOC in consultation with the Corps Commander, carried out a certain amount of reorganization of the forces on the following lines:


19 Lancers and 10 (SP) Field regiment were deployed to cover the gap between Chawinda and Jassoran.
Locating battery was moved to 15 Division area.

1 FF and 7 FF were placed under command of 1 Armoured Division for offensive operations.

16 September proved the correctness of the forecast that enemy will try to push his armour through the gap Chawinda-Jassoran. He had not realized that behind this gap, he would meet stiff opposition and was likely to be sandwiched in this narrow gap.

The enemy attack came opposite the gap formed by the triangle Bhagowal-Badiana-Chawinda.

15 infantry Division was ordered by the corps commander to exert pressure towards Bhagowal and 4 Armoured Brigade was warned to be ready to move into battle area when the situation demanded. In the meantime the battle progressed in an extremely fierce manner in the area around jassoran and badiana. The triangular formation had helped in luring the enemy forward and Chawinda defenders, the men of 24 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Malik Abdul Ali rose to the occasion. The enemy was allowed to bypass even the town of Chawinda from the North-West and reach Chawinda railway Station. Such havoc was caused to the Indian armour and Infantry in this narrow triangle as has rarely happened since the battles of Flanders in the First World War. The ground was literally piled with dead bodies. Three Indian battalion commanders lost their lives in trying to reach Mile Stone 5 behind Chawinda. It must be said to the credit of the Indian Army theat they fought with commendable courage and determination on this day. The W/T message to the first battalion commander who pushed his way upto within a few hundred yards of the road was rather interesting. It had said, "Get Mile Stone 5 and Maha Vir chakra is at your feet." This brave soldier died within a few hundred yards of the Mile Stone in question and was decorated posthumously.

Two more battalion commanders followed in his footsteps and gave their lives a little to his rear. The battle raged. The Indians coming in wave after wave and Pakistani determined to shoot to kill inspite of devastating artillery fire directed at their hasty dug in positions. The commanders in the rear at GHQ and Corps H.Q., must be given due credit for the correct evaluation of the position. There was no panic. They did not deploy any unit or any formation unnecessarily. They had confidence in their men and their commanders in the field. They knew that material superiority and large numbers do not always decide the outcome of the battle. Inspite of all determination shown by Indian troops it was throughout clear that they would have to be far better men, then they were to overcome the spirit of Pakistani soldiers. As one Pakistani Company Commander said, "It was a sight to remember all one's life and to get inspiration for it always". By the afternoon, the battle was over. Chawinda stood where it was with the same men in control of it. The Indians left behind them over two thousand dead and a large number of prisoners.

17 September should have been used by the Indians for licking their wounds but it appears that they still had fresh troops to push into the furnace that Chawinda was. It had become a matter of prestige with them. They attacked Chawinda at first light but failed to make any headway. The place was too hot for them. They tried to get into the gap between Butar Dog***** and Janewal and gave to 19 Lancers a good opportunity to do some good shooting. Then two squadrons of enemy armour tried to attack Chawinda from due west. This move was halted by 25 Cavalry and the artillery. The Indians withdrew, leaving a Centurian intact, 5 destroyed and 5 POWs behind, belonging to 17 Horse. 1 Indian Armoured Division had by now been completely disorganized and its morale was at the lowest ebb. The shortage of infantry in this sector has been felt acutely by Pakistani Commanders. 20 Baluch was as a result placed under command 6 Armoured Division and 6 FF which had arrived in Daska was also ordered forward.

The Indians changed their tactics on 19 September. Instead of putting in concentrated heavy attacks, they started attacking scattered village localities with small integrated groups and at the same time, continued shelling the whole area throughout the day. These small groups however, did not achieve anything. In actual fact, this piecemeal use of troops cost them greater losses, both in men and in the area already under their control. 6 Armoured Division launched a limited attack and cleared the enemy out of Batur Dog*****, Sadreke, Mundeke Berian, Jassoran and Fatehpur. Chawinda was also attacked by the Indians but its defenses withstood the onslaught as usual. The whole area south of railway line was also cleared of the Indians.

The Indians turned to infiltration tactics during the night 18/19 September and met a certain amount of success in the initial stages. They managed to recapture Jassoran and infiltrated through a number of gaps under the cover of darkness. This in the end, cost the Indians very heavy losses. Early next morning these isolated groups were surrounded heavy casualties inflicted on them. In addition 4 officers, 4 JCOs and 54 other ranks were taken prisoner. The Indian High Command had spread a false propaganda that Pakistanis did not take prisoners. This proved very costly to them in manpower. Their men as a result of this propaganda were reluctant to put up their hands but once the fact became known that Pakistanis had no intention of undertaking the impossible task of killing the million strong army, they started coming forward to be taken as prisoners of war, not only willingly but at times with keenness.

The artillery, throughout the battle on this front had taken heavy toll of enemy infantry and armour and many times Indian concentration had been broken up merely by well directed artillery fire.

Jassoran, which had been taken by the Indians during the night was attacked and captured by 1800 hours by a Coy of 7 FF under Major Abdul Rabb Niazi. In this action along 4 enemy tanks were captured intact and 13 were destroyed. Heavy casualties had also been inflicted on the enemy. In addition to dead and wounded, the Indians lost 35 men as prisoners of war in this action. Enemy air was fairly active during 19 September and so was Pakistan Air Force chasing them away every time they had appeared on the scene.

Early morning on 20 September the Indians launched a half-hearted attack. It appeared later that this was merely to cover their withdrawal from positions badly threatened by our forces. They suffered casualties as a result of this attack and 8 prisoners were taken. The Indians launched an attack on this day on the front of 15 Infantry Division also but they were successfully repulsed.

The Indians carried out a limited attack on 21 September against fatehpur, held by 20 Baluch but withdrew leaving behind six destroyed tanks and a few prisoners. The enemy air strafed our forward positions causing a few casualties. Efforts were made to clear Alhar of enemy early in the morning but did not succeed. Th place was fairly heavily held.

On 22 September, activity was confined to artillery dual. The Indians withdrew from few villages after burning them. 19 Lancers destroyed a few enemy tanks in Alhar but no large scale move was undertaken.

The C-in-C visited this front and decorated some of the officers and other ranks who had earlier distinguished themselves during the fighting in this area.

The cease fire talks had made any counter attack a matter of untimely wasted effort. 23 September, as a result was also a quiet day. The Indians confined their activities to heavy shelling but made no move forward. One enemy patrol fell into our hands abd was captured with its officer.