Akif

As we approach Sept 6 this year, we are reminded of the tremendous sacrifices our armed forces have given over the past 55 years in their efforts to preserve our independence. Back in 1965, our forces were tested for the second time since independence.
This thread will serve as a folder for articles related to Defence day. No discussions please.

Articles related to the events preceding and surrounding the war that started on Sept 6 will be included in this folder. You can also post relevant images alongwith articles.

Lets use this occasion to remember the tremendous sacrifices given by our jawans, and acknowledge the valuable freedom that we enjoy, thanks in large part to their sacrifices.

Pakistani Tiger

PAF Fighter Pilot M.M Alam

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On 6th September, 1965, during an aerial combat over enemy territory, Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam flying as pilot of an F-86 Sabre Jet, shoot down two enemy Hunter aircraft and damaged three others. For the exceptional flying skill and valor displayed by Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam in operations, he was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat. On 7th September, 1965, in a number of interception missions flown by Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam against the enemy aircraft attacking Pakistan Air Force Station, Sargodha, Squadron Leader Alam destroyed five more enemy Hunter aircrafts. In less than a minute , which remains a record till today. Overall he had nine kills and two damagers to his credit. For the exceptional flying skill and valour shown by him in pressing home his attacks in aerial combats with the enemy, Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam is awarded a bar to his Sitara-i-Juraat.

SOURCE


PAKISTAN - ALL THE WAY

Pakistani Tiger

Nishan-E-Haider



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Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed

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• Born: 1928, Hong Kong
• Commissioned: 1950, Punjab Regiment
  

On 6th September 1965, as Company Commander in the Burki Area of the Lahore Sector, Major Bhatti chose to move with his forward platoon under incessant artillery and tank attacks for five days and nights in Defence of the strategically vital BRB Canal. Throughout, undaunghted by constant fire from enemy small arms, tanks and artillery, he organized the Defence of the canal, directing his men to answer the fire until he was hit by an enemy tank shell which killed him on 10th September 1965.


PAKISTAN - ALL THE WAY

Pakistani Tiger

Squadron Leader Alauddin Ahmed (Sitara-i-Juraat)

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Squadron Leader Alauddin Ahmed, lead his squadron in twenty combat missions against the Indian ground and air forces. His leadership throughout the operations was cool, courageous and most determined which inspired the greatest confidence amongst pilots of his formations and resulted in destruction of many Indian tanks and vehicles. In his last sortie, he attacked and blew up an important ammunition train at Gurdaspur rail-head in complete disregard of his personal safety. During this attack on September 13, his aircraft was damaged and was reported missing over enemy territory. Subsequently, it was confirmed that the officer died in this action. For his exemplary leadership, courage and valor, Squadron Leader Alauddin Ahmed was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat

Pakistani Tiger

Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal (Sitara-i-Juraat)

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Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal flew many operational missions which played a vital part in the success of the Pakistan Air Force during the India-Pakistan war. He carried out these missions with determination, enthusiasm, outstanding ability and at great personal risk. His performance, throughout, was exemplary and highly inspiring for the personnel under his command. For his outstanding leadership, valour, loyalty and invaluable services to the Pakistan Air Force and the country, he was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Pakistani Tiger

Squadron Leader Munir Ahmed (Sitara-i-Juraat)

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During the war a high-powered heavily defended radar station near Amritsar was attacked repeatedly by PAF fighters. In all these missions, Squadron Leader Munir unhesitantly volunteered to fly without regard for his personal safety, exposed himself to intense ack ack fire for long periods in attempts to locate and destroy the target. In the final successful attack on September 11, he made the supreme sacrifice when his aircraft was hit. Before his last sortie, Munir flew eight combat missions and shot down an IAF Gnat on September 10. For displaying courage and determination in the face of heavy odds and beyond the call of duty, Squadron Leader Munir-ud-Din Ahmed was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Pakistani Tiger

Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui (Hilal-i-Juraat)

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On 6th September, 1965, Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui led a formation of three F-86 aircraft on a strike against Halwara airfield. Soon after crossing the Indian border Squadron Leader Rafiqui had been warned about a large number of enemy interceptors being in the air by the leader of a returning F-86 formation. He, however, continued his mission single-mindedly. On the way back, the formation was intercepted by about ten Hunter aircraft out of which Squadron Leader Rafiqui accounted for one in the first few seconds. After Squadron Leader Rafiqui shot down one Hunter aircraft, his guns jammed due to a defect and stopped firing upon which he refused to leave the battle area as he would have been perfectly justified to do; he, instead ordered his No. 2 to take over as leader and continue the engagement with the enemy.

Flight Lieutenant Saifullah Khan Lodhi was a navigator of exceptional ability and a completely dedicated officer. He possessed unusual skill, enthusiasm and drive, which enabled him to make a valuable contribution towards operations. He undertook several operational missions most cheerfully and enthusiastically, invariably attaining outstanding results. It was on one such mission on 11 September 65, that he lost his life. For his extreme dedication to duty, Flight Lieutenant Saifullah Khan Lodhi was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

This called for a quality of courage and dedication on the part of Squadron Leader Rafiqui equal to the best in the history of air-fighting. The end for him was never in doubt. He chose to disregard it and in the process, his aircraft was shot down and he was killed but not without his action enabling his formation to shoot down three more Hunter aircraft. Squadron Leader Rafiqui thus provide exemplary leadership in battle and displayed outstanding courage in the face of exceptionally strong opposition. His inspiring leadership and selfless example significantly affected the subsequent course of the air war in which the P.A.F. never failed to dictate terms to an overwhelmingly larger and better equipped enemy. Squadron Leader Rafiqui's conduct was clearly beyond the call of duty and conformed to the highest tradition of leadership and bravery in battle against overwhelming odds. For this and his earlier exploits, he is posthumously awarded Hilal-i-Juraat.

Pakistani Tiger

Flight lieutenant Saifullah Khan Lodhi (Sitara-i-Juraat)

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Flight Lieutenant Saifullah Khan Lodhi was a navigator of exceptional ability and a completely dedicated officer. He possessed unusual skill, enthusiasm and drive, which enabled him to make a valuable contribution towards operations. He undertook several operational missions most cheerfully and enthusiastically, invariably attaining outstanding results. It was on one such mission on 11 September 65, that he lost his life. For his extreme dedication to duty, Flight Lieutenant Saifullah Khan Lodhi was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Pakistani Tiger

Flight Lieutenant Younus Hussain (Sitara-i-Juraat)

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Flight Lieutenant Younus Hussain fought in air battles aggressively, fearlessly and with great professional skill. During one such engagement, he fought singly against six enemy aircraft and shot down two Hunters. Though his own aircraft was damaged in this encounter, he managed to bring it back to base safely. On 6 September, while attacking Halwara airfield, his small formation was intercepted by a large number of enemy and, although his aircraft was hit, he refused to break off the engagement, in complete disregard of personal safety, and was reported missing from this mission. He became a symbol of courage and professional ability for other pilots. For his , valour, professional skill and devotion to duty he was awarded Sitara-i-Juraat.

Pakistani Tiger

Leading Aircraftman Anwar Hussain (Tumgha-i-Juraat)

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Leading Aircraftman Anwar Hussain was on duty at a vital point. His position was rocketed by enemy aircraft and the place caught fire. Anwar Hussain was the only person on duty over there. He fought the fire single-handedly with the available fire appliances and managed to control it and thus saved expensive equipment. His death is an example of courage and unfaltering devotion to duty towards the service as well as to the country. He was awarded Tumgha-i-Juraat.



OUR BLOOD FOR PAKISTAN

Pakistani Tiger

Pakistani Tiger

Pakistani Tiger

1965 War

In September, 1965, the long standing border disputes, communal tensions and conflict over the question of Kashmir flared up in a full-scale war between India and Pakistan.

The War of Rann of Kutch

Skirmishes at the Rann of Kutch flared up almost accidentally in the spring of 1965, and India and Pakistan found themselves drawn into the first of their two undeclared wars.

The dispute goes back to the days of the British rule in India. The Rann was the bone of contention between the princely state Kutch and British Indian province of Sind.

When British India was partitioned, the issue was inherited by India, to whom Kutch acceded, and Pakistan, whom Sind joined, involving some 3,500 miles of territory leading to frequent border incidents, from January 1965 onwards.

By all accounts the Indian forces were badly mashed in the Kutch area by the Pakistan army.

It was at the Common Wealth conference at Britain, that the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both India and Pakistan to sign an agreement on June 30 to resolve the dispute. Failing to do so bilaterally, a tribunal was set up which announced its verdict on February 19,1965 by giving 350 sq. miles in Northern part to Pakistan and the rest of Rann area to India.

The War in Kashmir


Events in Kashmir were also moving towards a climax. The Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri added more fuel to the fire by taking steps to absorb Kashmir further into the body politic of India and said Kashmir problem occupied a secondary place to successful relations between India and Pakistan.

The application of articles 356 and 357 of the Indian constitution to the Kashmir state, which enabled the President of India to establish President rule in Kashmir and legislate there, were efforts to amalgamate Kashmir completely into the Indian union.

Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmiri leader took extensive foreign tours to enlist international support for the Kashmiri cause.
But he was arrested and the Kashmir legislative assembly adopted the constitutional amendments bill on March 30, providing:


a) the Sardar-i-Riyasat would henceforth be known as Governor and would be appointed by President of India instead of being elected by the local assembly.

b) the Prime Minister would be styled as Chief Minister, as in the states of the Indian union.

The Kashmiri people called for an all out war against the Indian imperialism and claimed to establish a National Government of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Having spill-over effect, the Azad Kashmir become increasingly restive. The Indian army made a series of new moves across the cease-fire line with her regular armed forces.

The Lahore Offensive

At 3:00 a.m. on September 6, without a formal declaration of war, Indians crossed the international border of West Pakistan and launched a three-pronged offensive against Lahore, Sialkot and Rajasthan. There was a fierce tank battle on the plains of Punjab. The domestic Indo-Pak conflict transformed into an international conflict and raised super power concerns.
Pakistani Soldiers

The U.S. suspended military supplies to both sides during the Indo-Pak war. Both the Soviet Union and the United States took a united stand to curtail the conflict within the boundaries of Indo-Pakistan from escalating into a global conflict. China had threatened to intervene and offered military support on behalf of Pakistan. It was this fear that both the Soviet Union and the United States pressured the UN to arrange for an immediate ceasefire, to keep China away from this conflict.

The main diplomatic effort to stop the fighting was conducted under the United Nations auspices and a cease-fire came into effect on September 23, 1965.

The Soviet Union which remained neutral when India and Pakistan went to war in September 1965, played the broker afterward at Tashkent.

A Soviet Government communique, formally announced on December 8 that the Indian Prime Minister Shastri and the Pakistani President Ayub would meet at Tashkent on January 4, 1966.

The Tashkent conference lasted from January 4 to January 10. The Soviet Premier Kosygin earned the praise as a peace maker. The main achievement of the conference was to withdraw, not later than February 25, 1966, all armed personal to the position held before August 5, 1964.

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(Indian attack initiatives)


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(Indian tanks captured during the battle of Chawinda)

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(Abandoned tanks of retreating Indians in the Chawinda sector)


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(Pak troops in fron of captured Fort Of Rann of Kutch)



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(An indian post office which the indian army abandoned in Chamb-Jauriyaan)


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(Headlines on an international paper)

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They Ran in Rann

Rann in Hindi, the official language of India, means the battlefield. Kutch, in the same language, means swamps of coastal island. The Rann may have been the battlefield, in ages gone by, during the period not under water. It certainly was the battleground when in 1762 the Muslim rulers of Sind chased the army of Rao of Bhoj, which was trying to invade Sind through Rann. History repeats itself. The Indians repeated the performance in 1965 with similar results. As in 1762, so also in 1965, they ran in the Rann southwards but the army defending Sind on this later occasion was too "Rules and regulations minded" and as instructed by its Government did not wish to go beyond the 24 parallel up to which the Government of Pakistan claimed as its territory.
True to their nature, the Indians started building up forces in the area from february 1965 in complete contravention of the agreement of 1960. In April 1965, Pakistan exchanged notes with India and tried to dissuade her from having recourse to fighting but India was adamant. "Power corrupts" people. Indian leaders were no exception to this universal rule. The vastness of India, the teeming dumb millions at the beck and call and the massive foreign aid from numerous sources went to the heads of Pandits. Those not used to command get spoiled by very sight of liveried servants of palaces. A million uniformed soldiers, sailors and airmen were beyond the digestive capabilities of the leaders of Indian National Congress. They were itching to plunge their country into war, no matter what the consequences were and they did it. The Indian leaders, Nanda Chawan and Shastri fluttered their dhotis in front of the troops in the Rann of Kutch and after brief flying visits returned to Delhi and ordered the Indian Armed Forces to put exercise "Arrow Head" into operation.

Vikrant the Indian Aircraft Carrier with 7 destroyers and frigates and the fleet tanker supported the Army. The Indian Navy was used for transporting, men and material to the disputed area. Before landing the troops and equipment the naval guns were allowed to practice gunnery. This was considered to be a morale booster for the troops who were known to have suffered from nightmares since the acute winter of 1962/63.

These moves by Indian forced Pakistan to order 8 Infantry Division to move one of its brigades in the area and another a few miles away. These regular forces were in addition to a number of battalion of Indian Border Police.

To have ordered an infantry brigade into the area was the only way to deal with a nation which refuses to come to amicable decisions across the table, a nation which refuses to accept arbitration by neutral powers and is adamant that no references should be made to any international Organization or the International Court of Justice. 51 Infantry Brigade as a result, moved to Badin on 7 March 1965 and took up position a little ahead of it but still outside the likely operational area. On the following day 6 Infantry brigade was also given Warning Orders to be prepared to move.

8 FF (Frontier Force), one of the battalions of 51 Infantry Brigade moved to Kanjarkot area a couple of days later. They had a troop of Mortars and a Battery of 14 Field Regiments under command. 18 Punjab also supported by Artillery and Engineers was given the role of supporting Indus Rangers in the area. There were strict orders not to advance beyond the line already held by the Rangers but under no circumstances to permit Indians to edge forward.

On March 9 there was increased wireless traffic on the Indian side and it later transpired that Ministers and senior Military Officers from Army Headquarters Delhi had visited the area. The plans for attack were discussed and approved at the highest level. General Chaudhuri, C-in-C, Indian Army is reported to have appreciated the details of the attack and further programme.

From 13 March, onwards the Indians evacuated nearly 50 villages which had Muslim inhabitants, on their side of the border, but issued arms and ammunitions to the Hindu residents of the area. Patrolling was intensified and the Indian Air Force was noticed to be unusually active and committed a number of Air Space violations. The Indian Army build up also could be noticed. On 24 March there were more Ministerial Conferences in forwards positions. By 29 March the combined operations along the coast had reached their climax and offensive action by Indian Army could be expected to be soon in the offing. The details of the Indian activities and unusual build up was brought to the notice of the Government and the President of Pakistan.

Undoubtedly a sound decision expected of a soldier. Hesitation and "peace at all costs" would have been interpreted as weakness and no one knew how far the thirst for territories would take the Indians.

Indians crept forward on the night of 5/6 April and dug positions within 100 yards of our Ranger post. When challenged they offered to discuss matters at a flag meeting at 0830 hours the following day. This flag meeting, although proposed by them, never materialized. Similar had been the fate of the proposed meeting with regard to the area occupied by Indian a little earlier, and called by them Sardar Post.

Having reconnoitered positions, Commander 8 Division, Major General Tika Khan, ordered the recapture of Sardar Post. The attack as a result was launched on the night 8/9 April, by 51 Infantry Brigade, and two out of three camps in the area were captured. The name Sardar post was erroneous. The Indians had a whole Battalion located in well prepared bunkers with well laid out MMG and LMG posts enfolding the approaches. 51 Infantry Brigade killed over a hundred Indians and took 21 prisoners including the officiating C. O. Major Karnail Singh. The third Indian camp though not captured was also evacuated by the Indians. The troops were however, to withdraw after completing their task. As a result the Indians reoccupied the position after three days with fresh troops. Pakistan's casualties in this action had been nine killed and sixteen wounded. Enemy had lost heavily and considering the number of prisoners they left behind the total number must have been a great deal more than claimed by our troops.

On 21 April Lieut. Nadir Pervez, with a platoon of 6 Punjab carried out a daring raid against a company of Indian CRP at a place known as Point 84 which they had occupied only recently. The raid was highly successful. The CRP men left their arms and equipment and disappeared before the raiding party could even close up with them. They left behind not only 3 dead bodies but large quantities of petrol and rations which were destroyed as such large quantities could not be carried back by the platoon. The ammunition, however, came handy and was utilized against the Indians later encounters.

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Although a little out of context, one is reminded of a conversation between an Indian prisoner of war captured at Jurian and a Pakistani Sepoy. The Indian asked him, "where did you Pakistanis get all this ammunition from". "Well", the Pakistani sepoy said a little too seriousl, "It is a secret but as you will be safely behind the barbed wire, I do not mind telling you. We captured large number of ammunition dumps during Kutch operations which we used at Chhamb. Then we captured more ammunition at Chhamb which we used at Jurian. To-day we have captured so much ammunition that we can use it elsewhere if you attack us again". It is not reported what the Indian replied, but that ammunition also was usefully employed.

In the meantime 6 Infantry brigade had also arrived in the area. C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa had ordered this Brigade to be located in area South of Jatrai and to eliminate any Indian encroachments up to Biar Bet.

On night 23/24 April the operation was taken in hand. 6 Punjab put in attack against point 84 which had since the last raid been reoccupied by the Indians in greater strength. The enemy was given the impression that the objective was the feature known as Chad Bet. The enemy holding this position was the crack Indian 50 Para Brigade and was supported by 17 Para Field Regiment in addition to a mortar battery. The enemy positions were well dug in, with overhead cover and complete network of communication trenches. Command posts, MMG posts and well dug in store and ammunition dumps. The Brigade Commander Brigadier Iftikhar Khan Janjua accompanied the assault battalion. The enemy opened up with every thing he had, guns, machine guns, LMGs, recoilless rifles, and 75mm Howitzers. The Indians however soon found out they were outflanked and outmaneuvered and soon withdrew in great haste, leaving behind a jeep, a number of trailers, ammunition and ration dumps and huge quantities of stores and personal belongings. The number of casualties could not be ascertained and one officer and a number of other ranks were taken prisoners.

It was then decided to attack Biar Bet on 26 April. This time it was felt that as an experiment it would be useful to try out tanks in this terrain.

A squadron of armour led the attack with 2 FF less two companies accompanying them. The enemy brought down a heavy concentration of all types of fire but in this open country every round seemed to have been aimed or pushed into an empty space. The men maintain that there was hidden hand deflecting the rounds which would, otherwise, have taken a heavy toll of advancing troops. The Indians have claimed having hit a number of tanks. Although over 200 rounds of RR were fired, the only thing they hit was a spade tied at the back of the jeep and an ammunition truck was blown up causing the only casualty of this operation. If ever devine hand protected His devoted servants it was on that day. By 0630 hours the position was completely in Pakistani hands. Here again the Indians abandoned their position in great haste, leaving behind one dead, RR mounted on a jeep, large quantities of ammunition and equipment and "Halva Puri", the delicious breakfast which is also relished by the Indian soldiers of an unfortunately starving nation.

Daily Telegraph, London seems to have summed up the situation very ably when it said,


"Biar Bet may mark the coming of age of Pakistan, the shedding of many infant fears. The calm that had been maintained in the country over past few weeks, in the face of near hysterical statements by responsible Indians, has been remarkable."
Rowle Knox, Daily Telegraph, London, May 5, 1965.

I led a party of Pakistani and foreign journalists to the Rann of Kutch area a few days later. After the G.O.C., Major General Tika Khan, had finished briefing the party, one of the foreign journalists got up and asked, "General you say you have killed 300 Indians, the Indians say they have killed 350 Pakistanis. Who would we believe." The General was not perturbed. In his usual cool manner he replied. "I am placing all my helicopters at your disposal. If you see, when you go over the battle area, that the junk of war is in front of me then the Indians are telling the truth, but if the junk of the war is behind me then I alone could be in a position to count the dead." "fair enough" replied the foreign journalist. On his return it was the same journalist who remarked "Gosh - You made them run in the Rann."

8 Infantry Division and its troops to whom the credit goes for making the Indian soldier run in the Rann, as they had never run before, were ordered the next day, "No more offensive". Common friends had realized the danger of these two countries fighting. The outcome had not been as expected. It was, therefore, incumbent to stop the shooting match. Except capturing a convoy of seven brand new Mercedies the division, after that, confined its activities to patrolling of the area immediately in its fornt.

Cease Fire came through the efforts of the British Prime Minister and the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Lal bahadur Shastri consoled his nation announcing, "We will attack at a place of our own choosing." As if Rann of Kutch had been a place of somebody else's choosing. He isno more to tell the world whose advice had resulted in this choice.

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The Second Round In Kashmir

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The debacle in Kutch disappointed the Indian Warlords. They had great hopes on this seemingly innocent border incident. It did not escalate as expected. The visits of reverted pundits like Shastri, the Prime Minister, and Chavan, the Defence Minister did not succeed in infusing life into the demoralized Indian soldier. Commanders like Major Karnail Singh believed that they were doomed to be taken prisoners whenever and wherever they went to war. A high powered conference was called. All the brass and all the excellencies attended. The adversaries were in the lobbies but near enough to influence decisions. After a little mud slinging between the politicians and the soldiers the conference settled down to sober deliberations. The blame for that defeat was thrown on the Pakistanis. They had not played the game expected of them as a small weak neighbor. They should have agreed to loose but instead they had stood up and had managed to attack with superior forces at the desired time and place whenever they decided to adopt offensive defense.
The decision arrived at by this high powered conference was to try again. The mighty Indian white elephant, its army, was to be geared into motion once again but this time it was considered best to roll it down the hills of Kashmir. As soon as it had gained momentum it was to be supplemented by an energetic push from all directions and across all fronts. It must be noted here that the principle of diversifying the points of attack had not yet been given up. In the plan to initiate the move from Kashmir the beginning was to be made once again from disputed territory. A certain amount of ingenuity and the dovetailing of political and military strategy was to be in greater prominence than in the case of Rann of Kutch. The Indians realized that Pakistan had relied too long on the promises of UNO. The question of Kashmir and Pak-Bharat problems had become in the meantime a matter of the so called global strategy of big powers. As a result Kashmiris had become so frustrated that since 1964 any aggressive move by India in Kashmir had brought about retaliation by AK Forces. Chaknot and other places had shown the changed attitude of the government of Azad Kashmir. The Indian shrewd mind was quick to come to conclusion. If Indian heightened her aggressive attitude in Kashmir through increased breaches of Cease Fire Agreement and raids into territory controlled by Azad Kashmir were stepped up, it was more than likely, in fact certain, as the Indian Prime Minister put it to the meeting-that Pakistan and the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir would reply in the same coin-1. It was even possible, said the pupil of Chanakya smilingly, that Pakistan may join hands with the revolutionaries in the valley and other parts of held Kashmir who would certainly rise if in addition to the use of agents provocateurs, the control was relaxed a little. If this happened, as he was mistakenly certain it would happen, then the next step for India was to march into Pakistan from all directions. "After all, all roads lead to Islamabad. What fun could you not have, General". The reply was very military like, "Yes Sir. You know the brave jawans of the Sena2 are itching to march westwards at your command". With a "Well done" and "I have faith in you and your brave jawans. Give them all my Ashir Bad3", and the meeting ended.

As a last reminded the Prime Minister turning to Mr. Nanda the Home Minister, had said, "Are the plans regarding dispatch of Jan Sangh volunteers complete". When the Home Minister nodded with "Yes" in an undertone, the Prime Minister smiled and left the room. The plan, they all thought was so simple that it could not fail to achieve the desired result. The Army of Occupation in Indian held Kashmir was ordered to set up raids across the Cease Fire Line and the puppet Government of Srinagar was instructed to provide agents provocateurs who could light the fuse and blow up the smoldering heap of explosives, that Kashmir had become. The security troops had to be moved nearer to the FDLs in any case. The relaxing of control, the presence of agents provocateurs and increased persecutions were expected to create conditions which, the Indians thought, would force Pakistan to listen to Kashmiri leaders' requests of marching into Indian held Kashmir.

The record of Indians in Kashmir was fairly black even before this eventful decision but immediately after this meeting the activities across the Cease Fire Line were stepped up out of all proprtions. The cease fire violations are reported to the U.N. observers by Pakistan during the past had been as follows:


1962 538
1963 283
1964 1464

They now produced a different picture in 1965.


January 189
February 224
March 325
April 335
May 438
June 480

With the figures of raids across CFL mounting up week after week it was only natural for India to expect Pakistan to retaliate. It can be said that the dovetailing of political with military strategy by India had succeeded to the extent that it drew out the Kashmiris exactly as the Indian Pandits had anticipated. They, however, had miscalculated the results in more than one manner, and particularly the action which they thought Pakistan would take. The error of judgement referred to by Lieut. General Kaul, in his book, cost the Indians heavily4.

The first mistake which the Indians made was that they had not weighed up the Kashmir situation inside the Indian held Kashmir itself. The repression which had been planned to be simultaneous with increased activities across CFL and to precede the final push had reached a crescendo by the time the level of junior executives was reached. These officials had been supported by thousands of armed Jan Sanghis imported from India after intensive training and careful screening. The plan boomeranged as a result. Persecutions and cruelty have a limit in every case. Even the most willing sufferer will not be able to bear patiently beyond a certain point. The same happened in Kashmir as it had happened in 1930. A countrywide tumult arose, a lot more than the Indians had expected. That part of the Indian Army which had been hitherto utilized for local protection and to frighten the Kashmiris was not there to stifle the voices. The troops had been moved forward to carry out raids through the FDLs into Azad Kashmir (AK) territory. The absence of these troops helped the revolutionaries to organize better that the Indian authorities felt they would be able to do.

The second miscalculation was regarding the exact reaction of Pakistan. Indian commanders had visualized that with the threat of AK, Pakistan High Command would move at least two divisions into AK to thicken up the defenses in addition to retaliation. This would have weakened the defenses in Lahore and Sialkot. Nothing of the sort happened. No units, much less formations were moved into AK. The Azad Kashmir leaders had been pressing Pakistan Government that if Pakistan was not in a position to act, the kashmiris should be left free, but so far Pakistan had been able to hold them back.

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It must be borne in mind that as far as Kashmiris are concerned the CFL is an arbitrary arrangement between the UNO, Pakistan and India separating the two armies, as they stood on Jan. 1, 1949. The civilian population is not affected by it. The Kashmiris consider themselves both morally and legally justified to cross and recross it in either directions at will. This is their birth right which not even the UNO can take away from them.

To say that even seven thousand Kashmiris infiltrated back into Indian held Kashmir through a thickly held CFL, maintained themselves for weeks after weeks in Indian held territory, moved bout, disrupted the Indian L of C, ran a government in certain areas without the active and planned cooperation of the local population , would seem highly improbable if not completely impossible. If however, they did all that and traversed the valley of Kashmir day in and day out under the very nose of the Indian Army then it would mean that they had been invited by the local revolutionaries and that the Indian Army was as inefficient as the revolutionaries were brave and resourceful. There can be no doubt that these revolutionaries were all Kashmiris. It appears that Indians were certain of a number of Pakistani formations having been brought into AK by Pakistan. At least this is what appears from the faked interrogation reports of the supposed Pakistani troops that India alleged to have taken prisoner. Banking on this they moved forward to liquidate Azad Kashmir. The Indian XV Corps Commander, who is responsible for the Indian held Kashmir, was given the task of capturing the whole of AK as his objective. All that he managed to accomplish was the capture of a few posts.

If Indian High Command was not prepared for the complete break down of its L of C in Kashmir, it was much less prepared for an offensive in Chhamb and Jurian. They may have felt that Pakistan could take to offensive in this sector and that may be the reason for the unusually strong defenses in this sector. But when it happened, it came like a bolt from the blue and completely put the Indians off balance. Their concrete defenses seem to have crumbled under the impact of this attack. They saw its implications rather belatedly, not until Akhnoor was really threatened. To stop it they had to do two things, both unpalatable to them, but most important. First they had to rush at least two divisions to halt this whirlwind advance of determined Pakistani and AK troops under seasoned commanders. Two of the most brilliant Pakistani Generals had so far shared the laurels. Major General Akhtar Hussain malik had set the ball in motion in a masterly manner and the move had been brilliantly competed by Major General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Both were awarded well earned Hilal-I-Jurat in these operations. India was loath to send reinforcements to this sector but the Pakistani commanders by uprooting three storied well-planned concrete bunkers had left no choice to Indian High Command. By sending two of the best Indian Divisions to halt this avalanche the Indian High Command was upsetting the Chaudhuri plan for the main invasion. Having been left with no alternative the Indians cut down the number of divisions from the most important sector of Sialkot.

The second alternative to the plan forced on India by this bold and swift action ordered by C-in-C Pakistan Army was the putting forward of the date of the invasion of Pakistan by the Indian High Command. Originally the date had been fixed for the fourth week of September.

The offensive at Chhamb, across the cease fore line was undertaken by Pakistan Army on September 1, 1965. The result of this offensive was not clear until the evening that day. The Indian invasion of Pakistan could be attributed to the result of this offensive only if the concentrations of the Indian Army opposite Khokhrapar, Lahore and Sialkot were planned, ordered and brought about after this date. We have ample evidence emanating from various sources and conformed by the statement of Indian POWs that the concentration of the Indian Army had started before Chhamb had been attacked by Pakistan.

For example 1 Indian Armoured Division and 2 (Independent) Indian Armoured Brigade received orders to move forward on the morning of September 1, 1965. It is obvious that the decisionhad been taken earlier in the day if not, a day or two earlier. 6 Infantry Mountain Division commenced leaving its locations somewhere in Central India during the last week of August 1965. 4 Sikh reached Frerozpur on 28 August and 9 horse left Saugar on 2 September. 67 Indian Infantry Brigade left Jodhpur on 1 September. 3 madras left Dhar Chilla on 30 August and 5/5 G.R. was out of babina by September 1. NO army can concentrate in a day. Neither is the present Indian Army reputed for excellent movement control and an efficient railway support. At the time of the invasion of Goa, when a little over one infantry division had to be deployed to march across the border, the Indian railway schedules were so upset as to crate a confusion lasting over for a week, The Indian concentration against Pakistan involved a much larger number of formations, inspite of the already sizeable concentrations close to West Pakistan border, and the shorter distance that the 1 Indian Armoured Division had to move.

The Indian Army, due to its huge size, had perforce to take a few weeks to concentrate on a number of points from a much larger number of cantonments. The movement had, therefore, to be spread out over a considerable period. This is the reason why the forward concentrations of the Indian Army started in mid August and according to the existing scheduling had to be completed by mid September. The reason for the move must have been guessed by some elements in the Indian Army. The diary of Lieut. Col. Nitranjan Singh, C.O. of 2 Grenaders , who left Bombay for Pathankot, with his battalion on 14 August, wrote regarding the impending war, on the following day, in his diary, "In the morning I felt the whole thing to be purposeless, illogical and without meaning. All that is happening is ridiculous by any standard". Another battalion of the same brigade left its peace station on 18 August. There are a score of other moves which provide ample proof that the invasion of Pakistan was already planned but for a later date. Pakistan's offensive in Chhamb merely rattled the Indian High Command and losing their sense of proportion they out forward the date of the invasion by two weeks and not only upset their plans but also unbalanced their whole army.

The utter dislocation caused inside held Kashmir, the danger posed to Akhnoor and the possibility of a threat developing against Jammu was too big a risk, or so thought the Indian General Staff, to wait for the scheduled date, in late September to arrive. It rattled General Choudhuri as much as Mr. Shastri and the whole of the Indian nation. It merely explains the frame of mind into which the ill conceived propaganda of Indian Government had placed the whole nation, but it shows the fear that had been generated by reverses in Kutch and later in Jurian Sector and the activities of a handful of Kashmiri Revolutionaries behind the Indian lines, that when Mr. Chavan, the Indian Defence Minister, informed the Indian parliament that Indian Army had invaded Pakistan, the whole house stood up to give him an unprecedented ovation. To neutral observers it appeared as if the much promised event had at last taken place. The digression was necessary to bring out the Indian plan and the way in which the Indian rulers wished to escalate fighting in Kashmir into a full scale war. We must now proceed with the events in Kashmir.

It was India which informed the world that she had failed in throttling the voices of the chained and handcuffed Kashmiris by announcing the presence of so called raisers in Kashmir.

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The first signs of Kashmiri revolution occurred on 8 August and attacks on Indian posts were so widespread that the Indian authorities arrested a number of oppositon leaders and influential Muslims in Srinagar and other large towns. The revolutionaries found tremendous support in Srinagar itself, probably because a number of them belonged to the metropolis but they preferred to remain out of the capital and attack military targets only. The burning of Batmalu and other villages by the Indians was too big a price to pay for killing the Indian soldiers. In addition there was more scope and a wider field of action out of Srinagar. The reports used by Radio Srinagar from time to time, about the skirmishes between the revolutionaries and the Indian security forces, are an accurate account as far as the chronology of events is concerned. The revolutionaries, all true and full blooded Kashmiris, did not always possess facilities to apprise the voice of Kashmir of their successes. Radio Srinagar came to their help in such cases and helped the revolutionary council in plotting the movement of their freedom fighters. No place was safe for them. Hindwara, baramula, Srinagar Airfield, Budil, Rajauri, Poonch and many other paces, as announced by Radio Srinagar, from time to time, were all being attacked, and the Indian forces punished. The freedom fighters were fighting like any other combatant troops. They had their makeshift uniforms and they never attacked the Indian Army except in the accepted military manner. The Indian Army had as a result deploy over one Infantry Division around Srinagar itself and nearly two Infantry Divisions in Poonch and Rajauri where due to the nature of the terrain and the material qualities of the local population they had brilliant successes in a number of pitched battles against the Indian Army. In Budil they formed a government of their own, set up a revenue department and established law and order like any other settled governmrnt. If they had not been sons of the soil itself it would not have been possible for them to have fought, maintained themselves, captured positions and administered vast territories in Indian held Kashmir. It was only after 23 September, when the whole of the Indian Army was uncommitted, that the Indians dared enter those areas.

The release of forces from elsewhere gave the Indians ample time and opportunity to re-establish their reign of terror once again. They had to fight pitched battles to regain control of those areas from the Revolutionaries. The Indians must know that the day of retribution cannot be postponed for ever and the blood of 50,000 men, women and children that the Indian Army and the Jan Sangh slaughtered during August and September 1965 will be avenged one day.

The Indians put into operation their plans to occupy Azad Kashmir during the third week of August 1965. The first attack came on Bharat Gali in the area of Haji Pir Pass. For seven days the position was continuously shelled by Divisional Artillery of 19 Indian Infantry Division in Baramula-Uri Sector. On 25 August 20,000 shells were fired within 12 hours on this one feature alone. One regiment of field artillery had fired 10,000 rounds that day. On 26 August 1 Para battalion led the attack. The position was occupied by a weak company of about 100 men the majority of whom were Mujahids from adjoining villages. They had come through the devastating shelling in a miraculous manner although their bunkers had all been raised to the ground. The company held their fire until the enemy was hardly 50 yards away. The result was devastating. The Indians were thrown back. They carried away all their wounded except one L/Nk Lal Singh. He, however, died while being evacuated to the hospital. They had left behind over 150 killed. AK casualties had been light, 2 killed, 5 wounded and 5 shell shock cases.

As all the bunkers had been destroyed the company occupied alternative position but this was not as well situated as the main position.

The Indians now chose to out in night attack. They launched the frontal attack at 0100 hours on 27 August which was successfully held. The Indians then pushed in another battalion from the flank and cut off the Bharat Gali position. AK troops fought like seasoned troops. Although the enemy had suffered over 300 killed in this attack they had inflicted heavy casualties on our troops also. The company lost 36 men that day. One platoon had 22 killed out of a strength of 25. The 2 survivors had all been wounded. Sheer superior numbers and unlimited resources had enabled the Indians to beat a force of less than 100 by a full infantry brigade supported by the divisional artillery and that also by making use of the cover of darkness. This is how Bharat Gali fell.

The attack on Bedori had started simultaneously with the attack on Bharat Gali. Here again there was only one company which was subjected to sever shelling for days on end. The non-existence of roads in this area are meant that the time needed to push forward reinforcements or supplies was four days. The result was that after 4 days of stiff resistance, the Indians over ran the position on 28 August.

As a result of this attack in force by the Indians the GOC ordered 20 Punjab to move from its previous location and strengthen the area opposite Haji Pir Pass. They moved in and took up positions in Khora Nakka on the evening of 28 August. They had hardly time to move forward one platoon. This small force was attacked on the morning of 29 August. The battalion hearing of the attack hurriedly moved forward but before they could reach the position the Indians had thrown back the platoon. 20 Punjab as a result, took up position at Kirni and the ridges next to it. With the capture of Khora Nakka the Indians had a clear passage to tauli Pir and on to rawla Kot except that 10 Baluch was holding Sheru Ka Dhara, the South spur of Sankh, where they had just moved in. The Indians wisely did not attempt to follow this course.

The next step on 20 Punjab came on the morning of 30 August. This attack was successfully repulsed with heavy casualties to the enemy. The performance was repeated in the afternoon with similar results. 20 Punjab was now reinforced with one company of 17 Baluch and one company from 10 Azad Kashmir. The helped in further stabilizing the situation. The Indian kept on attacking both during day and night throughout the next three weeks. On 7 and again on 8 September the Indians put in two night attacks which were sufficiently large strengths. The enemy suffered heavy casualties in both these attacks. On each occasion they fell back leaving behind a lot of ammunition and equipment. This senseless hurling of troops to such an extent that after their attack had been repulsed on 21 September they fell back like a mob without any control or discipline at all. That day they had left behind over 200 dead bodies. The attacking Indian troops on that day had been 6 Dogra, battalion of Indian Punjab Regiment and a Gurkha battalion.

The Indians now spent a few days in repairing the road Uri-Haji Pir Pass. It appeared that the enemy was preparing for the big push towards Bagh valley and from there to fab out into Azad Kashmir. It needed to build up a great deal of logistic support for such an undertaking and a road was essential for this purpose. Our defenses against his earlier efforts to push towards Bagh valley had so far stood well in spite of the shortage of troops and very difficult line of communication. The lack of artillery support had definitely affected the operations so far. 12 Pieces of artillery arrived in this sub-sector on 31 August. This made all the differences from that day onwards.

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In the South of this sector the Indians brigade in Punch had remained on the defensive. The revolutionaries had disrupted the L of C to Punch very badly and Punch had, at one time, become very nearly a besieged garrison. Lately the revolutionaries had diverted their main attention to Rajauri and as a result the Indian garrison in Punch had got a little breathing space. The capture of Mandi by the revolutionaries so close to Punch had caused the Indians a great deal of concern but it had also helped Punch garrison indirectly by releasing pressure against it. By 30 August the Indians were in a position to venture out of Punch and start the offensive northwards. They first started shelling Chand Tekri on 30 August. They had:


25 Pounders 18
Medium Gun 6
3.7 Howitzers 6
4.2 Mortars 6

Our forces had:


25 Pounders 1
3.7 Howitzers 2

The shelling of Chand tekri and other positions opposite Punch continued on 31 August and 1 September. On addition over 100 rounds of RR s were used by the Indians to break the bunkers on Chand Tekri on 1 September alone. The Indians put in an attack on 2 September at 0200 hours but it was successfully repulsed.

On 5 September the shelling of Chand Tekri was intensified by the enemy and attack appeared imminent. The misfortune was that there was no reserve available to reinforce this sub-sector. As this stage the two 3.7 Howitzers were also lost this area and the only artillery support available to Chand tekri was one 25 pounder gun. On 6 September the Indians launched a full brigade attack on Chand Tekri at 0430 hours. The battalions used were 2 Sikh, 3 Dogra, and 3 Rrajputana Rifles. Opposite this large force supported by 36 pieces of artillery, the position was held by:

· One Platoon of Azad Kashmir · Two Platoons Civil Armed Forces · One Platoon Local Mujahids · One Platoon Rangers



They were supported by only one 25 pounder gun. Outnumbered by 1:25 in manpower, 1:36 in artillery and with no MMGs, mortars or RRs these one hundred odd determined men withstood the onslaught as few defenders have done in the history of war. The Indians had used the hours of darkness for the initial approach. All three batalions had followed different routes. It was thus a three pronged attack converging on Chand Tekri. The last few yards were very costly to the Indians but they had captured their objectives. Our casualties in dead and wounded had been over 50%, to be exact 33 dead and 29 wounded had been. The C.A.F platoon had only 5 survivors. One can confidently say that they had fought well.

The Indian emboldened by their first success from the South advanced and attacked Ziarat on 9 September. This attack was successfully repulsed but during the next night the Indians using the cover of darkness out flanked the position and over ran it by first light. With the loss of Ziarat the road to Haji Pir Pass from the South was open to the Indians but not for use. The westward area dominating the road was still in our hands and the Indians could neither use nor repair it while these positions were held by us. The road was not used by the Indians as a result until the cease fire on 23 September.

The Indians kept on attacking the positions to the West of road Punch-Uri but all their attacks were repulsed. The last attack came on 20 September when 7/11 Sikh tried to gain ground across the road but after suffering a a large number of casualties they fell back. The two main positions which enabled the Indians to dominate Bedori bulge were Haji Pir Pass and Chand Tekri. As it happened both these were lost due to shortage of infantry and absence of artillery in that sector. Two weak battalions were holding a front of nearly 65 miles at a time when they had no supporting arms.

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India is Rattled

As a result of Indian offensive in Kashmir, the President of Pakistan in consultation with C-in-C, Pakistan Army, decided to undertake offensive operations and to attack the enemy in Chhamb and Jurian. The Indians had prepared concrete bunkers, interlinked by covered communication trenches and planned to meet all possible eventualities. They had a top story for observation, the ground story with MMG, LMG and RR emplacements for fighting and the basement for living. It was a proper defensive line and it succeeded in creating the defensive mentality. All defenses are double edged weapons. The stronger they are the greater is the intensity of defensive attitude produced by them. The close atmosphere acts on the minds of defenders very adversely thereby creating fear and queer type demoralization which engenders the quest for freedom of movement and is only removed by coming out in the open. When such defenses are subjected to heavy shelling, the explosion and their reverberating echoes produce a near concussion effect and the men inside either wish to run away or lie down listlessly. The Indian could not know the after effects of Maginot Line type of defenses. They had never experienced them. They thought it was good for prestige to have modern defenses and they adopted them1.
The Indians had started advancing in Haji Pir Pass area and due to the few troops in that sector it was more than likely that the link up between Indians advancing from Uri and those advancing North from Punch would soon take place. The Indians had thought that they would then be in a position to push westward in a view of the area being very thinly held by AK troops.

The only way to force India to release pressure in that area was to force her to pull out substantial portion for her forces assigned for the conquest of AK areas. An attack on Chhamb-Jurian which would threaten Akhnoor nerve center of Indian Line of Communication to Punch, was the correct answer. The Indian High Command when making g*****ose plans for the invasion of Pakistan did think of this weak link in their chain of defenses and that was the precise reason why they had paid extra attention to this sector and constructed seemingly impregnable concrete defenses.

The troops available to Pakistan for an attack on Chhamb were:

102 Infantry brigade
4 Azad Kashmir
Two Companies of 12 FF (R and S)
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers

In view of shortage of troops 7 Infantry Division minus 25 Infantry Brigade, 14 Para Brigade, 22 Cavalry and some other elements was moved to Gujrat area on August 30, 1965. Apart from elements of divisional troops the only formation left with 7 Infantry Division now was 10 Infantry Brigade. This was placed under command 12 Infantry Division for the initial phase. This meant that 12 Infantry Division now had three infantry brigade to attack with. It thus had the following

10 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): commanded by Brig. Hayat
102 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): Commanded by brig. Zafar Ali Khan
4 Azad Kashmir : Commanded by brig Abdul Hameed Khan
Two companies 12 FF
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers

Divisional artillery and other services.

The Indians had then in the areas 10 Indian Mountain Division, 191 Indian Independent Infantry Brigade and parts of 93 Infantry Brigade.

The task allotted to 12 Infantry Division was to destroy enemy in area Lalial, Dewa, Sakrana and Chhamb and then to threaten Akhnoor. The Divisional Commander Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik decided to undertake the task in two phases. In phase one, he decided to destroy the enemy West of Tawi in area in area Lalial, Dewa and Chhamb. The second phase was to cross Tawi and pose a threat to Akhnoor by destroying enemy in the enemy of Jurian.

One September 1, the attack went in at first light. The Corps artillery supported the attack led by 9 Punjab, 13 Punjab and 11 Cavalry less one squadron. By 1030 hours the enemy position at Phur, Dalla, Barsala, Jhanda, Malgotian, Chak Pundit and Munawwar had been rolled up. The strong fortification were of no avail to the Indian troops not used to live under artillery shells directed at them.

The enemy at Moel and Burejal felt insecure soon after the enveloping movement very nearly cut off their threat. They were, however, quick enough to realize it and managed to retreat before they were completely cut off. In the process they gave a good deal of casualties.

The enemy AMX tanks were trying desperately to stop the advance of Pakistani tanks. Which had by now swung North East of Phagla and were heading for Chhamb. Dewa was in the hands of Pakistanis by 1400 hours.

It was at 1630 hours that the Indian Air Force came to the rescue of the Indian Army2. Four of them all, Vampires, were taken on by Pakistan Air Force , and were bagged within minutes. One of the JCOs of 13 Punjab whose Platoon had been earlier strafed by the Vampires said afterwards, "I wasted time over trying to remember what a Vampire looked like. They never visited us again in this front." A few Hunters came near last night and strafed our leading troops but did not stay long enough to give battle to Pakistan Air Force. The example of vampires was still fresh in Indians minds to venture over Pakistani troops for long.

On the left of 102 Infantry Brigade, 4 Azad Kashmir had advanced at an equally rapid speed. The brigade objective had been Dewa and Lalial. 5 AK contained Pir Jamal and a few other localities, on the right, and 19 AK put in an attack on Patrara. The position was well dug in and supported by a number of MMGs in addition to artillery. All the likely approaches had been mined intensively by the Indians. In a well conducted attack the leading company of 19 AK assaulted the position from the left flank and by 0730 hours had pushed the enemy out of Patrara. The brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Hameed Khan, desirous of maintaining the momentum of attack ordered the C.O. to continue the advance and roll up the rearward defenses of the enemy. Chakla and Dewa had fallen into our hands by the evening.

5 Azad Kashmir which had, earlier in the morning, contained enemy positions at Dalla, Paur, Pir Jamal and Maira, put I attack on Maira at 1100 hours. The Indians put in very little resistance and place was in Pakistan Army's hands very soon. The incident of capture of 53 Indian other ranks of 6 Sikh Light Infantry, by Lt. Col. Babr of A.O.P deserves mention. He had seen a collection of Indians, lurking in a nullah (creek) from the air. He landed his helicopter nearby and between himself and his companion Capt. Akbar rounded up 53 Indians. They had no officer or J.C.O. with them. They had all deserted them and ran away in their command vehicles.

Moel was attacked by 5 Azad Kashmir in the after noon and was occupied by them by 1700. Mopping up operations were undertaken by the battalion in the rest of the area including Dalla and small pockets of the enemy were cleared in places where they had been bypassed by 102 Infantry Brigade and 19 AK except Pir Jamal.

Headquarters 7 Infantry Division had arrived in the area and it was felt that the command of this sector would be exercised more expeditiously if 7 Division commanded by Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan, controlled the operations. 12 Division Headquarters was too far from the area of operations and the C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa, felt that the command of operations should be exercised from the headquarters which was located closer at hand rather than the headquarters from a distance. It was inconvenient to continue controlling the battle from Tactical Headquarters for too long which had to be done until then. As a result of this decision 7 Infantry Division assumed of operations from 1100 hours on September 2.

Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan gave orders for the completion of Phase I. 102 Infantry brigade and 10 Infantry Brigade consolidated positions along river Munawwar Tawi. 102 brigade was at this stage in the North and 10 Brigade to its immediate South. 4 AK brigade further North consolidated the position captured by it on the previous day.

The position having been consolidated the GOC ordered 10 Infantry Brigade to cross Munawwar Tawi at 1730 hours on 2 September and established a brigade head across it.

The brigade head was complete by 1930 hours and both the battalions of 10 Infantry Brigade, 6 FF and 14 Punjab with 13 Lancers under command 10 Brigade crossed this formidable obstacle. It is surprising at the complete paralyzing of the enemy ground forces. The water in the river was no where less than 4 feet deep and it was a very wide stream. The going was not easy and the banks were fairly steep. The crossing was expected to be opposed by the enemy very stubbornly but it seemed Indian troops had lost all relish of opposing, the day before. Inspite of the whole day at their disposal to dig in and establish themselves across the river they had not been able to make up their mind that they would resist the crossing.

5 AK to the West, cleared Pir Jamal by 1630 hours after a very stiff and hand to hand fight. The Indians had fought stubbornly and accepted a large number of casualties before being forced to withdraw.

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http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/a...s/amxtanks.jpg

The next day, 3 September, the GOC Major General Yahya Khan, came forward and ordered d10 Infantry Brigade and 4 AK Brigade to resume the advance. He had held his 'O' Group at Singri, close to the battle area and was keen that the enemy should not be given any breathing space. The advance was resumed at 1200 hours. By 1700 hours 14 Punjab supported by a squadron of 13 Lancers had captured Nawan Hamirpur. 6 FF attack on Troti was , however held up. The position had been well prepared and strongly held.

On September 14 Punjab resumed the attack. The opposition was fairly stiff but they were able to push on to the outskirts of Jurian. In the meantime 6 FF had also cracked the Indians defenses at Troti and by 1700 hours were able to come up in line with 14 Punjab.

Heavy casualties had been inflicted on the enemy so far. A number of prisoners had been taken each day. One officer, 2 JCOs and 29 other ranks were taken prisoners, by 14 Punjab, on this day just in the vicinity of Jurian. The enemy, however, held on to Jurian during the night 4/5 September. The pressure from 10 Infantry Brigade was not relaxed at all and it had its effect.

The enemy was desperate. They had not so far put in any serious counter-attack but it appeared that what they did not like doing during the day they were persuaded to undertake under the cloak of darkness. They put in two counter-attacks against 14 Punjab position. Apart from other casualties they left behind 31 prisoners. The large number of prisoners of war that the Indians gave in such a short time and later on as well has remained a mystery to Pakistani Commander.

The attack on Jurian was resumed early next morning (5 September). 10 Infantry Brigade put in an attack at 0700 hours and it fell like a ripened plum. The fall of Jurian was a big event and it shook the Indian High Command. They had admitted the successful advance of Pakistani troops but rather belatedly.

On 2 September when it was over 24 hours at Chhamb had fallen, All India radio had merely said, "The Indian Air Force planes have gone into action in Chhamb Sector of Kashmir where Pakistan had launched an offensive across the Cease-Fire Line…… Pakistan artillery started shelling of our positions in Chhamb Sector early yesterday morning….." Later in the evening, to be exact at 1915 hours on 2 September, India admitted that Pakistan had advanced 7 miles into Indian held Kashmir. It is worth noting that she categorically admitted the advance to have been across the CFL at this junction.

On 3 September All Indian Radio gave an inkling of what India had in mind. It said, "The Prime Minister told newsmen in New Delhi this morning after his meeting with the opposition leaders that the whole strategy in regard to Kashmir will have to be reviewed and considered in a much wider context."

Chavan, the Defence Minister of India, said in the Lok Sabha on the same day, "We will have to take an overall review of our defenses. Our troops are fighting bravely and confidently. Necessary counter measures have been initiated."

The Indian Prime Minister made another significant statement the next day. He said, "It is possible that the government may not like to disclose certain things immediately." On 4 September the Indian Prime Minister was even more angry at Pakistan when he said, "The Grand March of the Indian troops will not halt so long as Pakistan does not provide a concrete and trustworthy guarantee of its good conduct." The last sentence is symbolic of Indian mentality. The grand march of Indian troops across Kutch, on posts in Kargil, against Pir Sahaba and Haji Pir Pass, in his mind, did not constitute breaches of Cease Fire Agreement but, when Pakistan paid back in the same coin at Chhamb and Jurian it hurt and the whole strategy had to be changed and the question of defense of India needed re-examination. The reality was different. India had known all along what her objectives were. As mentioned earlier, even if Pakistan had not attacked Jurian, there would still have been some excuse to march across international border. This hurt expression was merely for the consumption of the world which had not yet seen the blood thirsty Kali Devi under the mask of Pandit Nehru's Panch Sheela and Gandhian non-violence. Prime Minister who perpetually threaten their neighbors with "The Grand March" of their armies should not be the first to accept cease fire "here and now", which were the words used by Mr. Chhagla at the Security Council later during Cease Fire discussion. When their plans have miscarried, and they start massive armament programs the moment their desire of immediate cease fire has materialized. But these are Chanakiyan ways and one cannot accuse them of inconsistency because they are consistently inconsistent.



The President of India, Mr. Radha Krishnan, the philosopher, joined the chorus on 5 September and threatened Pakistan, when he declared, "it is the final battle that decided the fate of things." On the same day Mr. Shastri informed the world of his proposed invasion of Pakistan when he said, " We do not want that Pakistan should first cross into our territory and than sue for peace." In fact his announcement meant that his army was poised to cross the international border into Pakistan.

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On the same day Pakistani forces under Major General Yahya Khan headed forward towards Akhnoor, having mopped up all opposition in and around Jurian and in the villages of Thindi Wali Khad and Mawa Wali Khad. 13 Punjab had now moved forward as the vanguard. Due to hilly terrain, the movement was slow. The enemy was putting up s half hearted opposition inspite of the fact that the terrain was more suited for defense. 13 Punjab completely surprised the enemy through difficult terrain and captured Chak Karpal and Dalpat villages.

On 6 September, while India was advancing across the International border, 7 Infantry Division was poised to continue its move forward to Akhnoor and finalized the operations in this sector. 102 and 10 Infantry Brigades consolidated their positions along the line of Jamotian and Maira villages. The division, on this day, lost most its artillery support and 11 Cavalry.

On the other hand the enemy has received reinforcements and had launched a massive counter-attack with strong armour and artillery support against 10 Infantry Brigade positions. The division had just received congratulatory messages from the President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the C-in-C, Pakistan Army General Mohammad Musa, and the men were in the right mood to give a good reception to the Indian counter attack. The result was nothing less than whole sale slaughter. The counter attack came to a standstill by the early afternoon and the Indian withdrew to their original positions leaving behind over 500 dead bodies. The enemy had to bring in air support to extricate their forward elements. Pakistani casualties due to their counter attack were one officer Major Sarwar and six other ranks killed.

On 7 September the enemy put in fresh counter attack supported by armour against 13 Punjab and against positions held by 102 Infantry Brigade. Both counter attacks were beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy. 10 Infantry Brigade was ordered to be ready to move out of the area leaving behind only 102 Brigade and 4 AK Brigade. Although the idea to advance as far as Akhnoor had been dropped, the move forward and offensive attitude had not been given up by the GOC. The result was that when the enemy counter attacks failed, the Indians withdrew in a hurry.

During the night 7/8 September, the enemy again tried infiltration tactics but failed and had to withdraw leaving behind a number of dead and 1 officer, Capt. Chingara, 1 JCO and 20 other ranks prisoners of war, all that remained of a whole company of 120 strong. A heavy price to pay for the whims of some misguided senior officer.

This move forward after beating the India counter attack enabled our own guns to move forward and shell Akhnoor which created a great deal of panic among Indian L of C troops who were reported to have deserted from Akhnoor in large numbers.

The enemy tried hard to infiltrate through the gap between the two brigades but was unsuccessful and in fact suffered heavy casualties in the process.

The next morning, 8 September, 6 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brig. Iftikhar Khan Janjua H. J. was brought in and 10 Infantry Brigade moved out of the area. Enemy again tried to benefit from the gap between the two brigades and attacked from the area Pulhwal which lay between the two brigades. It was a sound idea executed in a haphazard manner and the result was that as on previous occasions it served as a killing ground. The Indians were hemmed in and wholesale massacre took place forcing them to give up the attack when it had hardly gone half way.

On 9 September the GOC decided that enough use had been made of this gap and ordered that it should be closed. 8 Baluch was ordered by brig. Zafar Ali Khan, Commander 102 Infantry Brigade to capture Pulhwal.

The Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Muhammad Siddiqui Kha, went into attack with great dash and moving forward with determination threw the enemy out of Pulhwal inflicting a number of casualties on the retreating Indians. The GOC 10 Infantry Division was furious at the way fighting had been progressing and ordered 191 Independent Indian Infantry brigade to put in a full scale brigade attack and recapture Pulhwal.

The Indian attack on a two battalion front came in a little before first light and was directed against positions held by 8 Baluch and 15 Punjab. Pakistan artillery alone was able to break up this attack. The Indians never reached near enough for Pakistani infantrymen to come to grips with the Indians. A few of the Indians who had not retreated and who preferred the safety of POW camps stood up after day break, raising their hands and waiving white handkerchiefs and were taken prisoners.

Akhnoor brigade was shelled by Pakistan artillery during the day causing great confusion in the L of C troops and the Indian garrison as a result had to more back a considerable distance to be out of artillery range. The enemy's habit of piecemeal attack was repeated on 11 September as well. A number of probing attacks were made by the Indians along the front but in each place they were beaten back with considerable casualties.

On 12 September, 6 Punjab with a company of 15 Punjab attacked and captured Devi Pur, thus extending their F.D.Ls. This brought in a a quick counter attack by the enemy after dark. They tried their best to recapture the lost territory but were beaten back with heavy casualties.

To the left of this position a company of 9 Punjab attacked Manami and captured not only the village but a dominating feature in the vicinity. 14 AK kept up pressure against the enemy in the area of village Ghauri while these attacks were being launched.

We lost 2 officers, 2 JCO and 10 other ranks on this day and 1 JCO and 36 other ranks were wounded but the operation had not only extended our F.D.Ls. but had taken a heavy toll of the enemy.

Night attacks are a normal feature of war and no critic can accuse the Indian Commanders of cowardice, for having a bias in favor of night attacks. The analysis made by Indian Command after the war appears to have further strengthened the Indian preferences for night attacks. Their Arguments are sound up to a point. Infiltration is easier at night and casualties are comparatively less due to the defenders' inability to bring down aimed fire, but when the defending troops do not fall back inspite of infiltration, and have adequate resources to deal with the infiltrators the resulting casualties are far more than in the case of day light attacks.

Enemy build up continued on 13 and 14 September. The only activity on the front by the enemy, however, was heavy shelling of our positions. On 15 September the enemy tried to capture a feature from 15 Punjab but were thrown back. Our fighting patrols destroyed a few of the enemy bunkers and brought back useful information. No large scale operation was undertaken by either side. On 16 and 17 September also the enemy confined his activities to heavy shelling. Due to heavy build up in the North of our position a certain amount of reallocation of troops and areas were undertaken by the GOC, within the divisional area.

On 18 September minor clashes occurred in which each side succeeded in getting a feature from the other. This was the first and only time an enemy battalion attack had managed to snatch a feature from one of our companies in this sector. On 19 September the Indians launched a major dawn attack on 9 Punjab front. The attack was repulsed with considerable number of casualties to the enemy. Enemy Hunters tried to strafe our forward position but seemed to be in a hurry to depart and did not cause any damage.

Until the cease fire there was no further major activity on the part of the Indians. They, however, became very active immediately after the cease fire and kept on putting in attack after attack and losing men without any sense or purpose until 3rd of December, 1965. Such reckless use of Indian manpower and material was not unique to this front. In was universal. On every front where the Indians had lost territory to Pakistan, and either the forward formations had not reported to the Army headquarters or the government of India had kept it secret from the press and the public, they were keen, in fact desperate to recapture the lost territories. Now that both the press and public were likely to know the exact state of affairs, the Indian Commanders were prepared to lose valuable Indian lives merely to save face. Queer philosophy but there it is.

5Abi

The Hour of Trial

The information regarding the Indian invasion took some time to reach Rawalpindi. The field commanders wanted to be certain that it was full scale invasion and not a few stray border incidents, before they informed the General Headquarters. The President, however, came to know of it through the Air Force channels earlier than the C-in-C of the army and rang him up to find out the exact situation. The C-in-C knew of the formations having moved forward and was quite confident that no amount of Indian pressure would be able to bend, much less break, the line of defense formed by the devoted sons of Pakistan, Threat of an Indian invasion was not new. It had existed from the very inception of Pakistan. Those who had expected to return and capture Pakistan within six months, after the two separated, had made known their intentions on many occasions. Pakistan was, therefore, prepared and vigilant.
It was after 5 a.m. by the time the Chief of General Staff, Major General Malik Sher Bahadur informed the C-in-C General Mohammad Musa that India had invaded Pakistan. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur, who was reputed for his coolness had been informed as soon as the commanders in the field were satisfied that the Indians had crossed the International Border and it was a full scale invasion and not a mere border incident . Having received the exact positions from all sectors, the Chief of General Staff apprised C-in-C in the meantime, as has been mentioned earlier, had been informed by the President and had the time to discuss the problem with him. One can visualize Maj. Gen. Sher Bahadur stroking his steel Grey mustache and smiling to himself on the folly that India had committed. He was confident that the officers and men of Pakistan Army would acquit themselves in a superb manner. His thoughts, however, were towards the mind of the enemy.

Director of Military Intelligence, Brig. Irshad Ahmed gave the debriefing in the Operations Room to C-in-C and others as he had anticipated Indian attacks on Lahore and Sialkot. There had been no information from Sialkot regarding any large scale Indian advance except at Jassar. The C-in-C and CGS were both of the opinion that Jassar was being used as a diversionary movement only. It was not yet clear but it appeared that the previous forecast of General Headquarters that India was likely launch Indian Armoured Division from Samba against Chawinda as the focal point still held good. As a result of this forecast the Staff College, Quetta had carried out Defense Exercises with regard to that area and most of the commanders and their staff were acquainted with the whole of the area and the likely tactics that the Indians would employ. The C-in-C and the General Staff having already apprised the field commanders of the plan could not do much except to watch the course of events and by keeping abreast of the developments remain one move ahead of the enemy all the time. As time passed and there was no sign of 1 Indian Armoured Division having been launched the feeling in the Operations Room became crystallized that the place chosen for the deployment of Indian armour was the Sialkot front. It was reasonable too. The terrain in front of Lahore was not as good as in Sialkot sector. There was a more weighty reason in favor of using armour in Sialkot. As explained earlier the political objective decided upon by the Indian Government was the complete annihilation of Pakistan which resulted in the formulation of the Military objective as the occupation of Pakistan territory and not the destruction of the armed forces of Pakistan. If General Chaudhuri who has been hailed by Indian writers as one of the greatest military commanders of Asia today, knew his subject, he would put his armour where it had a clear run for miles in front of it. Lahore rested with its back on river Ravi, clearly a tank obstacle and a bottleneck. On the other hand, a trust from Chawinda meant a clear run up to Wazirabad without any formidable obstacle except the canal for which enough brigade material had been arranged. If, by a diversionary attack against Jassar and Sialkot city they could entice away the defending force of the two flanks, it would give them a clear run up to Wazirabad without fighting a battle.

The Indian C-in-C acted exactly as the Pakistani General Staff had anticipated. He had decided to launch his armour from Samba on the firm plain of Sialkot and make a dash for the bridge of Chenab at Wazirabad. As will be seen later this decision cost him heavily. It was a bold plan but, as elsewhere, the action did not match the boldness of the plan. The bania in him, coupled probably with the interference from the politicians prompted and in a way forced him to over insure on less important fronts, there by making the plan not as effective as it would otherwise have been. If the Indian C-in-C had kept in front of him the objective to destroy the armed forces of Pakistan irrespective of the fact whether large tracts of our territory had been captured or not while doing so and without counting the number of places at which Pakistan was being attacked he would have been absolved of all blame for the failure of his army. As things stand today. The count on the first day, in addition to Pir Sahaba and Haji Pir Pass, regarding which the Indian radio was jubilant in every communiqué it gave out, was seven fronts. These seven fronts were Sialkot, Jassar, Wagha, Burki, Kem Karan, Kasur and Sulaimanki. The large number of fronts opened by General Chaudhuri did not upset the plans of General Mohammad Musa and his staff. They had catered for them. If General Chaudhuri had brought about dispersion with a view to dissipating the meager resources of men and material at the disposal of Pakistan then he was mistaken. As a leading foreign correspondent had said,


"These two fronts were intended to be diversional attacks to scatter Pakistan's smaller army over a wider front and weaken the defenses around Lahore. Man for man, unit for unit, it is probably safer to say that Pakistan Army is at higher standard of training than the Indians." (BBC 1410 hours, 10 September 1965)
Simultaneously with forcing Pakistan Army's general staff to spread out over a front of 1600 miles he was doing the same for himself. Lieut. General Kaul has commented on this aspect when he says,


"He (Indian C-in-C) was not justified in taking …. Offensive over two extensive an area, which prevented him from concentrating sufficient forces any where." (Kaul op. Cit., P.478)
If he had kept inferior froces at most of these points and contained superior Pakistani Forces, in order to get the requisite superiority at the decisive place then his decision to open so many fronts would have been militarily justified. As it became clear to the Pakistani General Staff on the very first day that the enemy had attacked on all fronts with a superiority ranging from 3:1 to 4.5:1 they were satisfied that they will not be forced to make major moves from one front to another except possibly in one or two cases.

5Abi

The odds against Pakistan Army on various fronts on the first day of war, the 6th of September, 1965, in terms of Infantry battalions were as follows:
Pakistan India
Tithwal Pak 1 3
Uri Sector AK 2 8
Haji Pir Pass 2 Pak 20

Punch Sector 3 AK
Akhnoor 6 18
Sialkot Jammu axis 2 9
Chowinda 4 24
Jassar 2 3
Wagah 7 17
Burki 2 7
Kem Karan 5 (6 Sep.) 13
Hussainiwala-Kasur 7 4
Sulaimanki 2 4
Sind 2 8


The story of how the commanders and men met this challenge on various fronts will unfold itself in the following pages. A mention, however, must be made of the manner in which the common man on the street and the administration stood the test in their "Hour of Trial". The Armed Forces are from the amongst the nation. It was only natural that the nation which produced men of unbeatable spirit must possess courage and determination of the highest order.

Unmindful of the Indian numerical and material superiority, the Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, issued order of the day with confidence in his army and faith in Allah. He was not wrong when he said, "Officers and men of Pakistan Army, this is the Hour of Trial and Glory".

He gave details of the areas where the Indians had invaded and continuing he said, "Our gallant troops defending these areas have stopped the enemy's advance and inflicted heavy casualties on their invaders. Within hours of the start of the fighting our forces have stabilized the situation and are in complete control of it………."