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- Mar 12th, 2005, 02:13 AM #1
From March 22 to March 24, 1940, the All India Muslim League held its annual session at Minto Park, Lahore. This session proved to be historical.
On the first day of the session, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah narrated the events of the last few months. In an extempore speech he presented his own solution of the Muslim problem. He said that the problem of India was not of an inter-communal nature, but manifestly an international one and must be treated as such. To him the differences between Hindus and the Muslims were so great and so sharp that their union under one central government was full of serious risks. They belonged to two separate and distinct nations and therefore the only chance open was to allow them to have separate states.
In the words of Quaid-i-Azam: "Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations that are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their concepts on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state".
Minar-i-Pakistan, Lahore, the landmark where the historic Pakistan Resolution was passed
He further said, "Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of nation. We wish our people to develop to the fullest spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people".
On the basis of the above mentioned ideas of the Quaid, A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq, the then Chief Minister of Bengal, moved the historical resolution which has since come to be known as Lahore Resolution or Pakistan Resolution.
At the All India Muslim League Working Committee, Lahore session, March 1940
The Resolution declared: "No constitutional plan would be workable or acceptable to the Muslims unless geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".
At the All India Muslim League session, March 1940, Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Mamdot presenting address of welcome
It further reads, "That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights of the minorities, with their consultation. Arrangements thus should be made for the security of Muslims where they were in a minority".
Quaid-i-Azam is presiding over the session while Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman is seconding the Resolution
The Resolution repudiated the concept of United India and recommended the creation of an independent Muslim state consisting of Punjab, N. W. F. P., Sindh and Baluchistan in the northwest, and Bengal and Assam in the northeast. The Resolution was seconded by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan from Punjab, Sardar Aurangzeb from the N. W. F. P., Sir Abdullah Haroon from Sindh, and Qazi Esa from Baluchistan, along with many others.
The Resolution was passed on March 24. It laid down only the principles, with the details left to be worked out at a future date. It was made a part of the All India Muslim League's constitution in 1941. It was on the basis of this resolution that in 1946 the Muslim League decided to go for one state for the Muslims, instead of two.
Quaid-i-Azam, Liaquat Ali Khan and Nawab Muhammad Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot at the Lahore Session, March 1940
Having passed the Pakistan Resolution, the Muslims of India changed their ultimate goal. Instead of seeking alliance with the Hindu community, they set out on a path whose destination was a separate homeland for the Muslims of India.
Pakistan as visualized by Chaudhry Rahmat Ali
share any thoughts and feelings guys, was the resolution exactly the way it should have been? were Quaid-e-Azam and his associates quick in achieving this huge goal in just 7 years from the day all efforts were focused on 23 Mrach 1940? was there any other way they could have done things better?
what, how and whether things went wrong after Independance need not be the focus of discussion, rather we could focus on sharing views regarding if, how and for what reasons could the resolution have been different, if there could have been anyhting diff or left to be desired in it that is...
who according to you played the REAL role in shaping the history of Muslims in Pakistan? was it a one man effort after all? just his ability to unite all self-rioting muslims who had been out of focus regardint their well being for centuries...the maulanas opposed the very idea, many modern muslims wanted to be with britain forver, many didnt mind the hindu domination and thought little of the 2 nation theory, so amidst all that went on, like it goes on even today among us crablike pakistanis who are masters of the art of pulling our own brethern down and stabbing each other, can we credit Quaid-e-Azam for being strong enough to deal and manage with all such elements of society? which other members of his team would we think were absolutely necessary for him to do what he did, without whom it simply couldnt have been...
Last edited by Haris; Mar 15th, 2005 at 08:17 AM.
- Mar 12th, 2005, 02:09 PM #2
My Points in brief
1: The greatest credit for the creation of Pakistan goes to two people Nehru and Mountabbetn, Nehru by his stubborn refusal to share power with the Muslim League in any shape or form and Mountbatter who egoistically brought the date forward for partition rather than make adequate preparation for the division of assets.
2: The Resolution was never implemented properly almost all the people involved in the original resolution were sidelined after Jinnahs death.
- Mar 13th, 2005, 03:23 PM #3
good points Zakk,
could you elaborate abit on the points.
how exactly do feel that the parts nehru and mountbatten played or the actions they took affected the muslim sentiment and psyche and intensity of desire for pakistan.
and what seem to be the major causes of sidelining of the old Jinnah comrades after his death? was it the typical menatlity, "khud to kuch karo nahin, jo kare use bhi na karne do..."?
- Mar 14th, 2005, 01:00 PM #4
Haris: Let me answer your questions point by point:
1) There was no desire for Pakistan in the sense of a separate nation till the mid to late 40's..the movement was more of an ideal..it was strongest in 3 groups, the Bengalis, the Urdu speakers, and Sindhis. nehru by his rejection of the cabinet mission plan forced Jinnah to go for an all or nothing gamble (which Jinnah won). Mountbatten with his pro nehru biases..both speeded up partition which led to masisve carnage and the legacy of much bitterness between nations..
2) Jinnahs comrades being sidelined is easier to answer..the process started with Liaqat Ali Khan who having no constituency in Pakistan..being an Urdu speaker was afraid of holding elections an allowed large scale rigging to take place in provincial elections..this created a precdent which allowed bureaucrats and army leaders to say all politicians were corrupt ..consider after Liaqat Ali Khans assasination..the the next two Governor Generals till Ayub Khan were both bureaucrats (one with army background). All in all...most of the Prime Ministers were bureaucrats or politicians with no support in the assembly...charismatic leaders ..most of whom were former or serving Muslim Leaguers were sidelined because they could not be controlled. Cases in point: Suhrawardy, Nishtar, Fazl E Haq, Dr Khan Sahib, Maulvi Tazimuddin, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Mian Iftikharuddin
Almost everyone of these politicians were on the wrong side of a dismissal or were ousted when the powers that be supported horse trading..
- Mar 14th, 2005, 01:27 PM #5
The 1940s resolution is so undemocratic and pathetic. By the same principle as 1940 resol, sunnis and shias should demand new countries, and y not Qadianis?
If u look at minorities in democratic and civilized countries, most of them demand self-rule based on general principles. homosexual marriages is now a state based thing now in USA. No federal govt has the guts to force a state like california to anull civil unions. But no state will be allowed to have racist laws in its constitution. This is federal concern.
What 1940 resolution should have chosen to do was demand more state (or provincial control) on general principle. This would have ensured msulims freedom.
Now look at what is happening in a poor state like Bihar nowadays, where muslims r in minoriity. Who is killing them? Many hindu politiciuans try to get their votes by favoring them like politicians here in USA favor blacks.
- Mar 14th, 2005, 08:47 PM #6
Originally Posted by Haris Zuberi
- Join Date
- Apr 15, 2004
Lator Pakistan proved the Jinah words. In coming years Hindus were totally sidelined and minimized in Pakistan.
Originally Posted by Haris Zuberi
For the same words they say that Hindu organozation RSS is racist and fascist.
- Mar 14th, 2005, 09:28 PM #7
Originally Posted by Haris Zuberi
- Join Date
- Sep 26, 2003
- Mar 16th, 2005, 05:51 PM #8Atlantis
^ this is too funny yaaron! Bangistan? really, seriously, is this a genuine map and was that the name they wanted to give it?
- Mar 16th, 2005, 05:54 PM #9Matsui
well 3 million got banged in 1971.. you tell me.
- Mar 16th, 2005, 06:45 PM #10
Lostsoul; you seem to have misunderstood the purposes of the resolution, it never advocated a nation per se it advocated a provincial grouping.
ajjan: Factually incorrect, inclusive of East Pakistan there were more Muslims in united Pakistan.. there is also a difference between the RSS and the Pak movement, the RSS believes the majority should not pander to the minority. The Pakistan movement believed that Muslims as a minority needed proper protection ina United India.
Mats: crude and factually wrong..
- Mar 18th, 2005, 09:31 AM #11
- Join Date
- Oct 16, 2002
Haris great thread buddy Way to go.
Sorry I don't have much to contribute further, you guys have said everything that's important.
I just want to say: Pakistan Zindabad
We are so lucky to have a HOMELAND.
- Mar 18th, 2005, 03:19 PM #12
Thanks for the analysis.
- Mar 18th, 2005, 10:36 PM #13
Originally Posted by Zakk
- Join Date
- Apr 15, 2004
You want to say that Muslim majority followed RSS guidelines in Pakistan?
- Mar 18th, 2005, 11:49 PM #14Originally Posted by MatsuiWeather forecast for tonight: dark.
- Mar 19th, 2005, 01:12 AM #15
- Join Date
- Jan 10, 2005
Regarding 3 million....that must have been the most efficient mass killing in the history....considering the fact that the Army had been incharge only a few month, going by that rate they would have to be killing one million bengalis every month, thats 33,333 every day, 1389 an hour, 23 per minute, you do the resource allocation equation and the plausibility of the 3 million number would come out highly exaggerated....
Well then again Godzilla has been know to use fuzzy logic to describe numbers and figures, e.g. describing the same number as both aggregate and rate.....
Even with all the resources, egregious conviction and technology the Nazis only managed 6 million in six years.......
- Mar 19th, 2005, 01:51 AM #16
- Mar 19th, 2005, 08:34 AM #17
- Mar 19th, 2005, 08:39 AM #18
an article of relevance by a Bilal Ahmed at Chowk.com
Should Pakistan Honor the Lahore Resolution?
The people of Pakistan need to ask why Pakistan failed to become a confederation in accordance with the spirit and content of the Lahore resolution.
Each year on March 23. the state and people of Pakistan commemorate the passage of the Lahore/Pakistan resolution with parades, decorations, illuminations, parties, music, and speeches. Ironically, the speeches are predominantly made by the propagators of the so-called Pakistan ideology and/or by pro-establishment sycophants, who rarely, if ever, discuss the actual content of the resolution. The Lahore resolution, which was moved on March 23, 1940 by A. K. Fazul Haq – the Bengal Chief Minister – and approved by the general body, reads as follows:
“. . . Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country [i.e., the British India] or acceptable to [the] Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz. that geographically continuous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. . . . Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the Constitution for minorities . . . for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights” (quoted in Ali, 1967: 38).
This resolution unambiguously called for the establishment of the Independent States of East and West Pakistan, while accepting the autonomy and sovereignty of their constituent units. Hence, many Muslim League leaders, particularly from Bengal, interpreted this resolution as a demand for two independent states. Although subsequent attempts by the central command to modify the Lahore resolution in favor of one state met considerable opposition from some Bengali Muslim Leaguers, a convention of Muslim League legislators finally passed a resolution (on April 9, 1946; in Delhi) demanding that the six provinces of Bengal and Assam in the northeast and Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province in the northwest be constituted into a sovereign independent state (Sayeed, 1968: 117). This resolution was a de facto amendment of the Lahore resolution. Some Muslim Leaguers (mainly the Bengalis) questioned the validity of the amendment on the ground that the council had no jurisdiction to amend a resolution that was passed by the general body in an open conference. Hence, the Muslim League leadership, rather than honoring the pluralist mandate of the Lahore resolution, opted for a centralist-assimilative framework that engendered an unnecessary rift within the Muslim League. What responsibility should Jinnah bear for this tension? A detailed critical analysis and interpretation of the South Asian historiography may provide a satisfactory clue.
Callard (1957) observes that Jinnah by nature was “a commander and leader of men [sic]” who never considered the other Muslim League leaders as his colleagues and partners. Jinnah indeed laid the foundation of an autocratic form of governance in Pakistan on August 14, 1947, by becoming not only the Governor General of Pakistan, but the President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and the President of the Pakistan Muslim League. Although Jinnah lead Pakistan for little more than one year, his actions were guided by his relentless desire to assimilate all Pakistanis in unity. It was this centralist-assimilative approach that led him to mistakenly curb dissent. A case in point is his oft-mentioned Dhaka speech of 1948 where he said:
“. . . let me make it clear to you that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State Language, no Nation can remain tied up solidly together and function” (Quoted in Jahan, 1972: 37).
It is perplexing why a man of Jinnah’s stature failed to recognize that the mainstream European theories and ideologies of nationalism, nation-states, and national integration were not practicable for the multicultural Pakistani society. It is this failure of Jinnah, and the proponents of the dominant Pakistani national discourse, that has created numerous hurdles for the national integration and development of Pakistan.
The Pakistani political regimes have consistently looked at the crisis of national integration in exogenous terms – particularly the adversarial role of India – and have thus painted the more vocal opposition parties and leaders as secessionists, disloyal Pakistanis, or traitors. One victim of such policy was the Awami League of Shaikh Mujeebur Rahman in East Pakistan. During Ayub Khan’s regime, Governor Monem Khan (who himself was a Bengali) adopted a dual policy to build political support for Ayub Khan in East Pakistan. On one hand, he provided official support and patronage to pro-establishment individuals and groups. On the other, he tightly controlled the press and media, revived a movement propagating that Bengali is a non-Muslim language, undermined the significance of Rabindranath Tagore, victimized intelligentsia, planted pro-establishment student groups in colleges and universities, encroached the autonomy of Dhaka University, and created “the atmosphere of a fascist state” (Jahan, 1972: 165). For example, the ministers in Monem’s regime would simply call the young officials directly and order them to imprison a man for purposes of harassment and the dispersion of his family (The Observer, London, March 23, 1969).
In 1966, the Awami League started the Six-Point Movement. This movement was different from the previous Bengali autonomy demands of 1950 and 1954. The first point in the Six-Point manifesto called for the establishment of a federation on “the basis of the Lahore Resolution and a parliamentary form of government, with supremacy of [the] legislature to be directly elected on the basis of [an] adult franchise” (Jahan, 1972: 167). Unlike the student-literati alliance of the previous movements, this new movement was not so peaceful due to the added participation of workers and street mobs. It involved various expressions of wrath against local symbols of authority, including “raids on police stations, looting of arms, and violent confrontations with the police” (Jahan, 1972, p. 169). Although Mujeebur Rahman made several offers to settle the matter politically, Ayub’s regime chose to adopt a confrontationist approach. Ayub Khan opposed the Awami League vehemently and threatened to use the military force against its allegedly secessionist and (so-called) disruptionist activities. Ayub’s reaction and rhetoric enraged the Bengalis further. As expected, Ayub imprisoned the top Awami League leaders for more than two years. After Ayub’s downfall, Mujeebur Rahman and his compatriots were released to eventually take part in the national elections. The post-release politics, particularly the blood bath in East Pakistan, is a black spot on Pakistan’s national history (see, for example, www. liberationmuseum.org).
Today, Pakistan is once again embroiled in conflicts between Islamabad (and Punjab) and the smaller provinces. In his first address to the nation, Pakistan’s current military dictator and self-appointed Chief Executive, General Musharraf, conceded to the existence of growing tensions between various segments of Pakistan. Hence, an important aspect of his seven-point agenda is to “strengthen the federation, remove interprovincial disharmony and restore national cohesion.” Musharraf seems to believe that one major step in this direction would be through the establishment of true democracy (i.e., the empowerment of common people) and good governance (see Musharraf’s Speech of October 17, 1999). During the past year, the Musharraf regime has prepared a local government plan to devolve power at the district and subdistrict levels. According to this plan, local elections will be held on a nonparty basis. This aspect of the plan (inter alia) has come under severe attack from many noteworthy political parties. The most devastating critique of the devolution plan has developed recently from Mumtaz Bhutto, Chairman of the Sindh National Front (SNF), who views it as a “conspiracy” to impose the One-Unit System once again (Dawn, September 13, 2000). Mumtaz Bhutto argues that equity between various territorial units could only be guaranteed through a confederal system. Is this a call for the dismemberment of Pakistan? How different is this position from (the late) G. M. Syed’s demand for the Sindhu Desh? Should the current regime shrug off this demand in a manner similar to the one adopted for Mujeebur Rahman’s Six-Point Manifesto? These are the kind of questions that need to be addressed in our national discourse immediately.
In contrast to the hardline positions of Mumtaz Bhutto and G. M. Syed, the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM’s) has adopted a more moderate approach. PONM is an alliance of several political parties which, in its Constitutional package, had once proposed the renaming of Pakistan as the “Multinational Federal Democratic Republic of Pakistan” with Baluchistan, Sindh, Seraikistan, NWFP (Pakhtoonkhwa) and Punjab having the status of states (Nation, April 2, 1999). This organization, following the lead/promise of Jinnah, is opposed to a theocratic ideological basis and image of Pakistan. It is important to understand that PONM is a somewhat loose and shaky alliance of political parties and leadership. Hence, it neither is a monolithic voice nor does it represent the wishes and aspirations of the majority of Pakistani people. Nonetheless, we need to assess the demands of the PONM and other dissenting voices on their own merit and in the greater interest of Pakistan’s national unity.
In sum, the people of Pakistan need to ask why Pakistan failed to become a confederation in accordance with the spirit and content of the Lahore resolution. Was it politically necessary and/or wise to replace the Lahore resolution by the less democratic resolution of 1946? Should Pakistan honor the Lahore resolution? Or, should Pakistan honor at least the spirit of the Lahore resolution and work toward the formation of a federation of autonomous administrative units – with a reasonably strong center – through a democratic-political process? Politics entails compromises. Shouldn’t Pakistan engage in a democratic-political process to honorably and amicably achieve the dual objective of ensuring citizenship and human rights and enhancing (multi)national cohesion?
Ali, C. M. (1967). The Emergence of Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press.
Callard, K. (1957). Pakistan: A Political Study. London: Macmillan.
Jahan, R. (1972). Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New York: Columbia University Press.
Musharraf’s speech of October 17, 1999 appeared in Dawn (Karachi) and all other leading newspapers on October 18, 1999.
Sayeed, K. B. (1968). Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948. London: Oxford University Press.
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